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ABSTRACT 
What is this book? 
This is an article-based doctoral dissertation in law, which forms a part of the 
University of Turku Doctoral Programme in Law. Its theme concerns the 
international and cross-border dimensions of competition law and policy – referred 
to as international antitrust. The articles on which the book is based have been 
published between 2014 and 2020. 
What is international antitrust? 
International antitrust refers to the collection of national competition legislation 
and related legal and enforcement praxis. This is complemented by the norms and 
standards of regional arrangements of the EU and others, and by soft law 
developed within international organizations, such as in the International 
Competition Network (ICN) or the Competition Division of the Organization for 
Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD). 
Why is the international antitrust world order so problematic? 
The problems of international antitrust stem from its complexity and 
fragmentation. There is no supranational legislator, nor are there clear 
intergovernmental binding agreements. Instead, there are more than 130 sets of 
national competition legislation, complemented by bilateral trade agreement 
chapters on competition and non-binding soft law. This results in significant 
overlaps and gaps, which create inefficiencies. In addition to general negative 
externalities and inefficiencies, the problems of international antitrust are often 
most suffered by smaller and less developed nations.  
What are the main reasons for not having a more coherent system? 
Competition law does not have a universally agreed goal or objective. This, in 
itself, leads to difficulties in creating a harmonious international system of 
competition law. Behind this formalistic reason are the differing needs of nations. 
Some nations are net exporters, while some are not. Some might have well-
functioning markets, while others do not. Whether or not part of competition law, 
public interest considerations nevertheless also play a role. Other reasons exist, too: 
major economic powers are reluctant to compromise, and intergovernmental trust 
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still needs to be improved. Hence, the most typical manifestation of cooperation is 
non-binding in nature and takes place via transgovernmental networks. 
How could international antitrust be developed? 
International antitrust could benefit from improved inter-agency coordination and 
by reducing the disparity in the quality of enforcement across agencies. The ICN 
and other fora are integral in fostering the trust and dialogue needed to improve 
such coordination. Codified competition law currently exists quite broadly around 
the world. However, in terms of enforcement, there is an enormous disparity 
between those competition authorities with greater experience and resources and 
those with less of both.  
A realistic idea to mitigate this disparity would be to better understand the 
potential of private firms to act as partners of officials in competition enforcement. 
Inducing firms to take steps toward more efficient self-enforcement could improve 
both the functioning of markets and competition enforcement. Such shared 
governance could be possible, should policymakers better utilize tools to 
incentivize firms to take their compliance work seriously. This would de facto 
extend the reach of enforcement, as firms would self-enforce with more rigor.  
Further, a renewed interest in multilateral, structured resolutions should be 
encouraged. The realities of international antitrust have changed since the past true 
attempt in the early 2000s. In particular, the number of competition authorities has 
increased drastically, as has the amount of competition law they enforce. Also, 
many more nations nowadays possess substantial experience in international 
cooperation in competition matters than ever before, which has led to an arguably 
higher level of trust. The time may be right to consider multilateral initiatives with 
a stronger level of commitment than those based purely on voluntary cooperation, 
an example of which is a so-called “opt-in” model. Initiatives aiming at 
streamlining procedural matters and preventing cross-border anticompetitive 
conduct could and should be considered – ones that would, however, not result in a 
transfer of nations’ sovereignty over their domestic markets.  
KEYWORDS: competition law, international law, compliance, international 
cooperation, competition policy, positive incentives 
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TIIVISTELMÄ 
Mikä on tämä kirja? 
Tämä on artikkelipohjainen väitöskirja sekä opinnäyte osana Turun oikeustie-
teellisen tohtoriohjelmaa. Väitöskirjan teemana on kilpailuoikeuden ja –politiikan 
kansainvälinen ja rajat ylittävä ulottuvuus, jota väitöskirjassa kutsutaan 
kansainväliseksi kilpailuoikeudeksi. Artikkelit, jotka muodostavat väitöskirjan 
ytimen, on julkaistu vuosien 2014 ja 2020 välisenä aikana. 
Mitä on kansainvälinen kilpailuoikeus? 
Kansainvälinen kilpailuoikeus käsitteenä viittaa kansallisvaltioiden kollektiiviseen 
kilpailuoikeuslainsäädännön kokoelmaan ja siihen liittyvään oikeuskäytäntöön sekä 
sitä valvovien viranomaisten käytäntöihin ja päätöksiin. Näitä täydentävät EU:ssa 
ja muualla toteutettu alueellinen kilpailuoikeusyhteistyö ja sen pohjalta syntynyt 
normisto sekä kansainvälisten järjestöjen, kuten International Competition Network 
(ICN) ja Organization for Cooperation and Economic Development (OECD), 
tuottamat suositukset ja ohjeistukset. 
Mikä tekee kansainvälisen kilpailuoikeuden nykytilasta niin ongelmallisen? 
Kansainvälinen kilpailuoikeus on epäjohdonmukaista ja pirstaleista. Millään 
yksittäisellä taholla ei ole ylikansallista lainsäädäntövaltaa, eikä ole olemassa 
selkeitä valtioiden välisiä sitovia kilpailuoikeuden yleissopimuksia. Sen sijaan on 
yli sata erillistä kansallisen kilpailuoikeuden järjestelmää, joita täydentävät 
kahdenvälisten kauppasopimusten kilpailuoikeutta koskettavat kappaleet sekä ei-
sitovia ohjeistuksia ja suosituksia. Tämä johtaa olennaisiin sekä päällekkäisyyksiin 
että aukkoihin, minkä vuoksi talouden vaikuttavuus on heikompi kuin sen tarvitsisi 
olla. Yleisten kielteisten vaikutustensa lisäksi on huomattava, että kansainvälisen 
kilpailuoikeuden ongelmista kärsivät usein eniten pienemmät ja vähemmän 
kehittyneet valtiot.  
Mistä johtuu, ettei yhtenäisempää järjestelmää ole olemassa? 
Kilpailuoikeudella ei ole yhtä maailmanlaajuisesti hyväksyttyä tavoitetta tai 
päämäärää. Tämä itsessään johtaa hankaluuksiin pyrkiessä luomaan yhtenäistä 
kansainvälisen kilpailuoikeuden järjestelmää. Mainitun muodollisen syyn takana 
ovat kuitenkin kansallisvaltioiden eriävät tarpeet. Eräät valtiot ovat nettoviejiä, kun 
taas joillain vaihtotase on alijäämäistä. Joillain saattaa olla olennaisesti paremmin 
 IV 
toimivat kotimarkkinat kuin joillain muilla valtioilla. Kansainvälisen kilpailu-
oikeuden kehittymiseen vaikuttavat väkisin myös valtion kansalaisten laajemmat 
intressit. Muitakin syitä on – maailman talousmahdit eivät mielellään tee 
myönnytyksiä, ja valtioiden välinen keskinäinen luottamus kaipaa kohennusta. 
Tämän vuoksi verkostomainen, vapaaehtoisuuteen perustuva yhteistyö on sen 
tyypillisin ilmentymä.  
Miten kansainvälisen kilpailuoikeuden tilaa voisi parantaa? 
Kansainvälisen kilpailuoikeuden kehitystä voisi edesauttaa parempi kilpailuviran-
omaisten välinen koordinaatio sekä kaventamalla eroa, joka eri kilpailu-
viranomaisten kilpailuvalvonnan laadun välillä on. ICN ja muut, kansainvälistä 
yhteistyötä edesauttavat järjestöt ovat keskeisiä keskinäisen luottamuksen ja 
keskusteluyhteyden vaalimisessa, mikä on tarpeen mainitun koordinaation 
kehittämisessä. Kilpailuoikeutta on jo varsin laajalti ympäri maailman. Mitä tulee 
kilpailuvalvontaan, niin eri kilpailuviranomaisten välillä on nykyisellään valtava 
ero, joka johtuu vaihtelevista resursseista ja kokemuksesta.  
Realistinen idea tasata mainittua eroa olisi paremmin ymmärtää yritysten 
potentiaali toimia ikään kuin viranomaisten kumppaneina kilpailuoikeusvalvon-
nassa. Yritysten ohjaaminen kohti tehokkaampaa itsevalvontaa voisi edistää 
markkinoiden toimivuutta ja parantaa kilpailuvalvontaa. Mainittu, eräänlainen 
osittain delegoitu hallintovalta voisi olla mahdollista, jos lainsäätäjä hyödyntää 
monipuolisemmin itselleen kuuluvia työkaluja yrityskäyttäytymisen ohjaamiseen, 
mukaan lukien erinäisillä kannustimilla.  
Olisi syytä kannustaa uudistuneeseen kiinnostukseen monenvälistä, jäsenneltyä 
yhteistyötä kohtaan. Kansainvälisen kilpailuoikeuden taustalla vaikuttavat 
olosuhteet ovat muuttuneet 2000-luvun alkuvuosina olleen edellisen todellisen 
yrityksen jälkeen. Kilpailuviranomaisten lukumäärä on globaalisti olennaisesti 
noussut, kuten on myös heidän valvomansa kilpailusääntely. Lisäksi, aiempaa 
useammalla maalla on nykyään kokemusta kansainvälisestä yhteistyöstä kilpailu-
asioissa, mikä lienee myös johtanut kasvaneeseen keskinäiseen luottamukseen. 
Aika voisi olla otollinen harkita sellaisia monenvälisiä aloitteita, joilla on suurempi 
ohjausvaikutus kuin puhtaasti vapaaehtoisuuteen perustuva yhteistyö, mistä 
esimerkin tarjoaa ”opt-in” -malli. Monenväliset yhteistyöjärjestelyt paitsi virtavii-
vaistaisivat hallinnollisia käytänteitä, niin myös vähentäisivät yritysten rajat 
ylittävää, kilpailun kannalta haitallista käyttäytymistä. Aloitteiden ei kuitenkaan 
tulisi johtaa liiallisiin suvereniteetin siirtoihin, vaan maiden tulisi jatkossakin kyetä 
vastaamaan sisämarkkinoistaan.  
AVAINSANAT: kilpailuoikeus, kansainvälinen oikeus, compliance, kansainväliset 
suhteet, kilpailupolitiikka, kannustimet. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 General 
‘Efforts to develop competition law on a global level…are central to global 
governance, because the competitive process is itself at the center of global 
economic relations.’ 
David Gerber1 
Competition law, also known as antitrust, is largely based on the legislation of 
nation-states,2 the European Union (EU) being an exception where EU Member 
States have transferred part of their sovereignty to the supranational EU level. 
Competition law systems are thus largely national. This way of structuring 
jurisdictions based on territory or citizenship is common in other regulatory areas, 
too. However, an important distinction is that competition law regulates markets, 
and markets are about trade, which today flows in every direction– irrespective of 
national frontiers. Cross-border trade is the catalyst for the need for understanding 
and developing international antitrust.  
Achieving the relative freedom of global trade that we currently enjoy is not 
automatic, though. Instead, it is a great example of the international community3 
coming together to cooperate in ways the benefit everyone.4 This concerns direct 
barriers to trade, such as high tariffs for imports, but also what are known as non-
tariff boundaries, such as standards that may arbitrarily differ in an attempt to mask 
protectionism. The existence of the ‘international community’ referred to above is 
actually not automatic either, but a coming together of nation-states with markedly 
 
 
1  Gerber (2010) p. 345. 
2  This dissertation uses antitrust as a broader term, so as to include policy in addition to 
mere law. When the term ‘competition law’ is used, this is in reference to both hard 
and soft law, but not a broader policy framework. 
3  See e.g. Koskenniemi (2007) for further discussion on the concept of the 
‘international community’ in relation to international law.  
4  Although arguably everyone has not benefited equally. See e.g. Bourguignon & 
Thomas (2015).  
Michael Ristaniemi 
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differing backgrounds and interests. It has manifested itself on numerous 
occasions, which is a remarkable achievement in itself. 
Much convergence and harmonization has taken place in areas that are 
ancillary to cross-border trade. These include the work under the auspices of the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), concerning both tariffs, subsidies, and 
intellectual property (TRIPs5), as well as standardization under the International 
Standardisation Organisation (ISO). It may, thus, be surprising to realize that no 
truly broad multilateral system exists concerning rules that govern and protect 
competition – the very heart and engine of a market-based economy. This is a 
severe deficiency and is the impetus for this dissertation. 
To be clear, international antitrust does exist. It is, however, incoherent and 
fragmented, with both gaps and overlaps.6 It is largely based on national legislation 
and case law. To be specific, most nations today do have codified competition law, 
most of which do contain many common elements, albeit as a result of 
uncoordinated efforts. National legislation is complemented by international soft 
law guidelines and ‘best practices’ recommendations created by organizations, 
such as the Organisation for Economic Coordination and Development (OECD) 
and the International Competition Network (ICN).7 
Within international antitrust, the degree of substantive consensus varies 
greatly. The detrimental effect of cartels is broadly recognized.8 However, 
treatment of abusive conduct in a dominant position, merger control, and vertical 
restraints are areas in which substantive differences exist.9 These differences are 
partly due to the differing goals of competition policy. For the EU, for example, 
protecting the functioning of its internal market is critical and stringent treatment of 
vertical restraints is partially used as a tool to do so. Even more differences exist 
with regard to state subsidies that may distort competition. Managing and limiting 
such state aid is a key policy area for the EU – to help secure the functioning of its 
internal market – but not for most of its trading partners. Subsidies are 
internationally primarily governed by WTO rules on subsidies.10 
 
 
5  The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
6  See, e.g., Ristaniemi (2014) and Ristaniemi (2017). 
7  Inter alia ICN Guiding Principles documents, ICN Recommended Practices 
documents, and ICN Frameworks, as well as OECD Recommendations and Best 
Practices on Competition Law and Policy concerning various themes. 
8  Gerber (2010), p. 311; R. Whish at the 2015 International In-House Counsel Journal 
Competition Law Conference. 
9  Gerber (2010), p. 299. 
10  See, e.g., Singh (2017) for an analysis of the WTO’s treatment subsidies and related 
implications for nations at various levels of development. 
Introduction 
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National legislation is naturally enacted with national interests in mind, which 
is not problematic in situations where the reach of jurisdictions enforcing such 
legislation remain within the relevant territory. The international nature of trade 
seems to stretch beyond this limitation. One might thus wonder whether a grouping 
of national systems constituting an international system is an optimal way to 
structure such a system. In short, it is not. 
Contemporary international antitrust is, however, not merely a theoretical 
conception. It is de facto constantly present, since competition law enforcement 
transcends national borders.11 As trade becomes ever more globalized and national 
competition authorities (NCAs) gain in experience, the need for a better 
understanding of the international dimensions of antitrust is bound to increase. This 
prediction is underscored by a drastic increase in the number of competition 
authorities and amount of international trade that has taken place in the past 
decades.12  
Further, as a result of this mosaic of law, combined with a few decades of de 
facto convergence, one can deduce specific norms and standards that are 
sufficiently similar in many jurisdictions to be truly considered to have transcended 
beyond their national origin. Such norms include substantive ones, such as a near 
universal ban on hard-core cartels,13 but also procedural ones. Fox & Trebilcock 
have studied procedural norms applied to competition cases in various jurisdictions 
by synthesizing nine different studies with the aim of understanding whether global 
norms exist.14 Their findings indicate that indeed there is a “remarkable degree of 
consensus on the basic procedural requirements and institutional performance 
norms of competition law institutions”.15 Another example of such a norm 
concerns the need for ex ante merger control, in order to prevent excessive 
concentration, a procedure that is varied in its details across jurisdictions, but 
whose underlying idea is widely accepted. 
International antitrust is complex. It is a mixture of considerations that emanate 
from varying national interests. Some nations have much to export, while some 
have to live with a trade deficit – importing more than they export. Some have 
large but inefficient domestic markets, while others have small but nonetheless 
functioning ones. And everything in between. This leads consideration involving 
 
 
11  This occurs particularly via the effects doctrine. See Ristaniemi (2014) for how 
extraterritorial application of the effects doctrine in competition law impacts 
multinational corporations. 
12  See supra pp. 13–14. 
13  Supra 8. 
14  Fox & Trebilcock (2012). 
15  Ibid., p. 8. 
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international antitrust to be about more than mere administrative exercises to iron 
out trading inefficiencies – it easily enters the realm of politics.  
General international law is also complex – to a large extent based on differing 
and fluctuating national political interests. This starts with even finding a proper 
definition for ‘law’ in the context of international law. Guzman argues that ‘any 
international obligation that has a substantial influence on national incentives is 
considered to be law.’16 Bradford and Posner further argue that ‘international law 
is best understood as the result of overlapping consensus’ of the otherwise 
conflicting views of major powers, at the core of which nations consider 
themselves bound, that such consensus is a fluid concept and is subject to change at 
the whim of each major power.17  
The current state of international law is one characterized by both pluralism 
and polycentricism. The era of constructing supranational regimes appears a thing 
of the past and its monumental emblems, such as the United Nations (UN) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), are struggling. Focus on intergovernmental 
multilateralism has shifted to a dualist reality of intergovernmental bilateralism that 
is complemented by multinational and transgovernmental networks.18 In a 
fragmented system, the importance of cooperation is highlighted. And whenever 
cooperation is not feasible, coordination should be still ensured. Coordinating 
practices and enforcement by-and-large require an upgrade from the current status. 
All in all, international antitrust is important. We live in a world where market 
economies form the engine that keep our societies going. Since markets often 
extend beyond national frontiers, it is crucial that the functioning of markets is not 
compromised by their existence. Uncertainty to business, unnecessary procedural 
delay and cost all represent the kind of friction that should be systematically 
minimized. International antitrust is not only international law and policy, nor is it 
only national law and policy, but a mélange of the two. Finding the right balance is 
the key. 
As will be described in following chapters, trends in international law are 
rather analogously relevant for international antitrust. Recognizing this is useful, as 
it is often considered a regime sui generis. Regardless, there is potential for 
reflection and learning from the fluctuations in adjacent international regimes.  
 
 
16  Guzman (2001), p. 72. 
17  Bradford & Posner (2011), pp. 5–6. 
18  Slaughter (2005), pp. 5–20. 
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1.2 Research questions 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to synthesize international antitrust as it is 
now and to consider realistic and pragmatic ways in which it could be improved.19 
The dissertation establishes and approaches said niche in two principle ways.  
First, it attempts to grasp what international antitrust is today, while also 
seeking to shed light on what international antitrust is not. This includes rules, 
practices, as well as the reasoning for them, and also the inconsistency consisting 
of gaps and overlaps. The interrelation between colliding national legislation and 
enforcement thereof as well as transgovernmentally prepared soft law is 
particularly interesting in this respect. Also, differences in political interests are 
perhaps more present in the international dimensions of antitrust – in a 
complicating way – than when considering only a single nation’s regime without 
comparison to others, given that there is no single supranational parliament or other 
institution capable of decision-making unilaterally. In particular, the dissertation 
aims to understand how international antitrust has evolved since the breakdown of 
the WTO negotiations and the related last major literary wave describing it, both in 
the early 2000s.  
Second, the dissertation analyzes where there may be realistic possibilities for 
improvement. In this regard, the focus is on measures available to policymakers 
and enforcers. The current level of international cooperation seems to be less 
efficient and ambitious than it could be, by which I mean that while the status quo 
is arguably not optimal, there is no strong push for transformative change. The 
dissertation undertakes the challenging task of proposing novel, but pragmatic 
ways to improve the current state of affairs, while still bearing in mind the 
inevitable limitations on what is within the realm of possibility. This does not 
necessarily mean deeper substantive harmonization, although this would – in itself 
– likely reduce inconsistency.  
Another question is whether coherence or consistency are per se worth 
pursuing and if yes, then to what extent. In other words, at issue is whether 
incoherence or inconsistency inevitably and inherently leads to inefficiency or not. 
This is not obvious. In the context of international antitrust, this raises the question 
of whether to be content with a highly pluralist and also increasingly polycentric 
system that exists today. For example, convergence may result in reduced policy 
experimentation.20 Oftentimes, initiatives by jurisdictions are closely followed by 
others and a degree of cross-fertilization may occur as a result. Through less 
 
 
19  By this, I refer to a system that is more efficient as a whole, i.e.not from the 
perspective of a single nation-state.  
20  De Burca et al. (2014); Lianos (2016) p. 43. 
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experimentation, there is less information to be shared, and thus less knowledge to 
be learned.  
Whatever the optimal path for international antitrust, the current state is far 
from optimal: wrongdoers are only sometimes caught, fines seldom cover the 
overcharges of international cartels, all the while multinational businesses face 
undue burden and unpredictability.21 Pragmatism is brought to the dissertation by 
respecting the influence of major economic powers in the development (or lack 
thereof) of international antitrust. Working within this framework, the dissertation 
aims at providing up-to-date proposals and ideas that could improve the currently 
suboptimal reality of international antitrust.  
The first two articles shed light on the legal issues that arise from the patchy 
order of international antitrust. Namely, what is the legitimacy for such 
inconsistency that results, inter alia, from extraterritorial application of 
competition law, and how detrimental or problematic actually are related gaps, 
such as the treatment of export cartels. Both are examples of inefficiencies22 in the 
global trading system that result from the inconsistency of international antitrust. 
Extraterritorial application of competition law creates severe challenges for 
multinational firms, which may face potentially conflicting competition 
enforcement from a multitude of jurisdictions simultaneously. Export cartels, on 
the other hand, often contain elements that would be deemed illegal hard-core 
cartels in domestic settings, but legal treatment differs because of their cross-border 
nature.  
The dissertation seeks to answer the following question: If (and when) these are 
problematic and detrimental issues, why are they not resolved. The two topics 
addressed in the articles represent a broader group of problems in international 
antitrust, which were chosen for two particular reasons. First, I have had prior 
exposure to both these themes. Second, and more importantly, they link to the very 
core of the global trading system and are not novel issues – analyzing export cartels 
and the related extraterritorial application of competition law illustrates a 
fundamental conflict between competition policy and trade policy. Many 
inefficiencies of international antitrust can – I believe – be overcome, should we be 
able to address this conflict.  
The third article turns its attention to the potential, the future of ‘what could 
be’. It acknowledges the importance of major global economic powers – the EU, 
 
 
21  Connor & Helmers (2008); Gal (2010), p. 57; Levenstein & Suslow (2014); 
Ristaniemi (2014). 
22  By ‘efficient’, I refer to an action being able to reach its maximum potential, unless 
otherwise mentioned. That is, I take the liberty of using the term broadly, beyond its 
definition in economics. 
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the United States (US), and the People’s Republic of China (China) – in molding 
the future of international cooperation in antitrust. It is difficult to think of a form 
of cooperation being effective without the support of such major powers. The main 
research question here being to understand how each of the selected major powers 
approach international cooperation in antitrust matters and the reasoning behind it. 
The findings provide an appropriate framework and context for considering the 
feasibility of a proposal in areas where further international cooperation might be 
plausible. Without giving a definitive answer, such understanding could reveal 
potential avenues for how to improve international antitrust.  
Finally, given that it appears that only incremental improvements to 
conventional international competition cooperation are plausible, the dissertation 
analyses potential unconventional paths that could yield more transformative 
improvements, in particular, by extending the capacity of enforcement agencies by 
promoting soft enforcement conducted by firms. This approach would incentivize 
firms to self-enforce with more rigor, through the desire to obtain certain positive 
rewards. Such a complementary approach could be interesting in as much it could 
improve prevention of anticompetitive conduct, that is to help ensure markets work 
as they should. Concurrently, it would help even out the significant enforcement-
related disparities across antitrust enforcement regimes globally.  
As a collective, the articles form a narrative of snapshots that illustrate both the 
current state of international antitrust and what it has the potential to become. The 
upcoming chapters of the dissertation help fill the inevitable gaps and provide a 
fuller image of the paradigm in question. This is done also by linking international 
antitrust to the discourse in international law and governance, in attempt to find 
analogies and useful hints. 
1.3 Motivation for study and research gap 
The main motivation towards the topic of international antitrust is based on a 
general interest towards the interaction of politics, trade and law. These three areas 
make up the perfect storm that is international antitrust.  
My inspiration originates from the theme of my master’s thesis, which 
discussed the intersection of airline alliances and competition law. The airline 
industry is one with a particularly international market and a strong political 
backdrop. It was dazzling to the law student who then still assumed that laws and 
legal systems were generally coherent and comprehensive, both domestically and 
beyond. The ‘messiness’ that results from the interplay of logic and structure with 
political interests was interesting to the extent that it invited a deeper dive into the 
realm of international antitrust.  
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There has been much study about international antitrust. This has been 
particularly pronounced at times when a multilateral arrangement has been subject 
to intergovernmental negotiation, such as during the WTO Cancún round. A typical 
focus area has been the study of the then-current ways of cooperating – particularly 
the discussion about whether binding or voluntary based rules would be better in 
the context of antitrust. Both approaches have their proponents. Some have drawn 
on the WTO agreement on intellectual property – TRIPs – as an example of what 
should perhaps be mimicked in the realm of antitrust.23 Others emphasize the 
differing interests of developing countries as a key reason for why no uniform rules 
should even be desirable.24 Whatever the reasons, international antitrust has 
received considerably less attention in the past decade, yet the problems of the 
current system have been and still are numerous 
While most previous attempts to improve harmony have failed, this does not 
necessarily indicate a destiny of perpetual failure. Actually, conditions for 
improving international antitrust are today arguably particularly favorable in at 
least two ways.  
First, most nations today largely accept the beneficial nature of market-based 
competition. This is apparent by the drastic increase of nations with codified 
competition law and the understanding that comes with it – an imperative for a 
sensible multilateral dialogue to even be able to take place. Second, there is 
increased trust in and a somewhat changed attitude towards international 
competition cooperation that has taken place in the past few decades.25 The ICN, in 
particular, is exemplary in the amount of information-sharing and other operative-
level cooperation that it has facilitated between competition authorities of all parts 
of the world.26 This work has surely contributed to the said improved trust and the 
foundation it has helped build. 
I believe in finding resolutions, and international antitrust seems like a topic 
that is in need of a novel resolution. Both current international cooperation and the 
research work surrounding it seems to be in a state of stagnation of sorts. A current 
trend in modern society is about moving towards positive rewards in guiding an 
actor’s conduct, instead of only threatening with punishment.27 However, relatively 
little has been said about how positive incentives, that is rewards, could aid the 
goals of competition law. Further, a trend in public policy seems to favor systems 
 
 
23  See e.g. Guzman (2000).  
24  See e.g. Stiglitz (2017); and Fox (2012). 
25  Gerber (2010), p. 335. 
26  A personal bias to be disclosed is that I act as a DG Comp Non-Governmental 
Advisor regarding its ICN-related work and as such, I do support their cause. 
27  De Geest, & Dari-Mattiacci (2013), pp. 344–345. 
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of shared governance, where firms and other non-state actors are given a more 
pronounced role. Also, international governance has been moving towards regime-
specific networks from the traditional intergovernmental dialogue. All in all, 
harnessing the public role of private firms has arguably been under-utilized in the 
competition enforcement space, including in an international context.  
My previous working experience as an in-house legal counsel for large 
multinational corporations concerning compliance, anti-bribery and corporate 
responsibility, in particular, has particularly helped appreciate the perspective of 
the firm as well as the curious disparity between how competition law both treats 
and concurrently undervalues preventive compliance work in comparison with that 
of other regulatory areas. There is surprisingly little research on the potential of 
competition compliance from the perspective of society, particularly such that 
draws from other disciplines, such as behavioral economics or psychology. The 
role of firms as partners and even extensions of competition agencies presents 
potential that has relevance for international antitrust, in the form of improving 
both deterrence regarding competition law breaches as well as the consistency of 
international antitrust. It is interesting to consider what is required to bring this 
about – and represents a material research gap. 
1.4 Structure 
This is an article-based dissertation. It is based on a collection of articles, each of 
which has been separately published. The articles are republished as a part of this 
dissertation with permission from the journals in which they have each originally 
been published. They provide snapshots of chosen focus areas and attempt to form 
a rough narrative. The sections of this dissertation allow for providing a broader 
image and a discussion of the broader context.  
This introductory chapter intends to provide a general image of the dissertation 
project as a whole and an understanding of why such research is both necessary 
and relevant. It is also an appropriate prelude for Chapter 2, which introduces the 
dissertation theme in more substantive terms, thus giving an overview of the 
background and framework that will allow readers to put my research questions 
into context. Chapter 3 focuses on the analytical framework and research methods 
that have been employed in this dissertation. This includes describing certain 
assumptions that have been made, as well as the limits on what it has been possible 
to cover within the scope chosen. Chapter 4 consists of summaries of each of the 
published articles – these articles collectively form the backbone of this 
dissertation. The full-length versions of the said articles are found at the very end 
of this dissertation. Chapter 5 and Chapter 6 attempt to provide additional context, 
first by elaborating on contemporary discourse in general international law and 
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governance and what international antitrust could learn from it in Chapter 5, and – 
finally – by concluding in Chapter 6 by providing ideas for future research and 
describing how this dissertation contributes to the wider discussion on international 
antitrust and thus what its value and contribution is likely to be. 
 
 11 
2 Research Background 
2.1 The concept of law in international antitrust 
Law never exists in a vacuum. It exists as a part of society and as a result of it. This 
is especially true of any international legal order, which is rarely governed by a 
single supranational actor. As mentioned in the Introduction above, international 
antitrust is a messy normative system – one which could use further defining. Its 
foundation is built upon and its existence is dependent upon the realities and 
fluctuations in politics, law, and trade.28 Below is a related illustration followed by 
a concise explanation in an attempt to provide an overview of the underlying 
concept.29 
 
Figure 1.  Composition of international antitrust. 
 
 
28  Aine (2011), pp. 41–55. 
29  Aine (2001), p. 270. 
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In broad terms, politics relates to governing and law-making, but also influencing 
the preceding two activities. Aristotle has described lawmaking as the most 
important task of the politician.30 Indeed, a feature of nation-states is the authority 
to enact legislation that it also enforces. Internationally, the lack of a supranational 
authority and legislator poses its own additional considerations. Establishing 
international norms is, instead, based on cooperation and negotiation. Such 
interaction is usually led either by politicians or by expert officials. At its core – 
currently at least – international law is also heavily reliant on technical experts to 
uphold and develop it. This is also largely the case within international antitrust 
where officials and other experts have a pronounced role. Koskenniemi actually 
calls for a re-emergence of politics into international law, in order to combat 
managerialism and pluralism and to be able to return to the (political) project of a 
truly cosmopolitan community.31  
If politics is about lawmaking and influencing the process, then law is the 
outcome. However, defining the concept of law within an international context is 
challenging. Apart from formally binding intergovernmental treaties, most 
transnational or global law is inevitably and inherently ambiguous for several 
reasons, including not only the absence of a controlled process by which a resulting 
norm is enacted, but also the lack of clear enforcement.32 States are not the only 
actors when it comes to the creation of international norms and standards. 
Consequently, many resulting international norms and standards resemble a type of 
21st century lex mercatoria.33 In international antitrust, operative officials, as well 
as other non-state actors are highly involved in establishing norms and standards – 
particularly within transgovernmental networks.  
Commercial markets are the driving force of any competition legislation and 
policy. Market economy is a liberal concept in which individuals and the 
companies they create have freedom to operate and profit from such operations. As 
commerce extends beyond and across national frontiers, ensuring efficient 
competition requires the same. In any case, a key component in understanding 
international antitrust is trade and related policy. While competition legislation 
aims at ensuring functioning markets, trade policy is a different kind of animal. 
While competition legislation is agnostic about non-domestic markets, it is open-
minded domestically by aiming at ensuring opportunities for entrants offering 
 
 
30  Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Aristotle’s Political Theory in Nicomachean 
Ethics VI.8. 
31  Koskenniemi (2007); see also Kant (1784), pp. 41–53 to look back closer to the 
source of this thought. 
32  Husa (2018), pp. 33–37. 
33  Ibid., pp. 77–85. 
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innovation and lower prices. Trade policy, on the other hand, is more reserved 
domestically by aiming at protecting domestic players – for instance via anti-
dumping legislation – while externally aiming to be a trailblazer by opening up 
new markets for exports. The two have some similarities but concurrently also 
material points of divergence – what is clear is that trade is a core part of defining 
international antitrust.34  
Law, politics, and trade interlink in ways that enable an idea of international 
antitrust. Although separate, they are not diffused. Politics and trade can be seen as 
having a clear relationship, particularly concerning the functioning of the market 
economy and the impact of the political process on it. 35 In general, law seeks to 
manage the said relationship and this can also be said of international antitrust.36  
International antitrust has already received significant attention for many 
decades. The following section will elaborate on its history before proceeding to its 
present state.  
2.2 History of international antitrust 
Creating comprehensive multilateral arrangements in competition law has failed 
time and time again; however, this is not due to a lack of trying.  
The need for some kind of coordination has been realized at least since the 
times of the League of Nations. Perhaps surprisingly – already in 1927, its 
Industrial Committee on the World Economic Conference voted on a proposal to 
establish a harmonized and coherent international antitrust system.37 It would have 
included supranational statutes and related supranational enforcement. However, at 
that time, there was considerable diversity in how anticompetitive conduct was 
viewed – an example of which is that industrial cartels were seen as beneficial to 
society and thus partially favored. Given the lack of a common foundation, the 
proposal was bound to fail, and fail it did.38  
Since then, a number of other attempts have been undertaken. The closest to 
having jointly agreed multilateral competition rules was in the late 1940s, when a 
chapter on anticompetitive business conduct was negotiated into the draft charter of 
the envisaged United Nations (UN) agency, the International Trade Organisation 
 
 
34  See e.g. Sweeney (2004), pp. 413–416. 
35  Aine (2001), p. 271. 
36  Ibid. 
37  League Of Nations (1927). 
38  Gerber (2010), pp. 19–55; and Lianos (2009), p. 5. 
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(ITO).39 The charter was never ratified and the ITO eventually never became a 
reality, although this was due to reasons unrelated to said competition chapter.40  
The latest true multilateral attempt to reach an agreement took place in the 
early 2000s. International antitrust was the subject of both discussion and 
negotiation within the UN and the WTO, as a part of the so-called Doha 
Development Round.41 However, competition policy was dropped from the list of 
items to be further negotiated during its Fifth Ministerial Conference in Cancún, 
Mexico, in September 2003.42 To this day, competition matters are yet to return to 
the agenda. That being said, the Doha Development Round is still ongoing and this 
stagnated state of affairs is not limited to how competition matters are seen, as 
such, but is also part of a broader paralysis of the WTO.43 
There were clear reasons for dropping competition matters from the WTO 
negotiation agenda. Among them were irreconcilable differences between the 
contracting parties, both substantive and practical. Developing countries were 
particularly wary of subjecting themselves to the WTO dispute resolution 
mechanism, given their generally low level of experience in competition policy 
issues, coupled with scarce resources, limiting then-foreseeable capacity building.44 
In addition, there was an arguably low level of mutual trust and a number of states 
were worried that agreeing to formalized international competition rules would 
limit their alternatives concerning domestic economic policies, which could, in 
turn, result in a undesired loss of sovereignty.45 
Harmonizing competition law has proved to be a considerable feat and one that 
has not gained true traction outside the EU and the Andean Community.46 The 
incongruity is best illustrated by recognizing that, as of today, it has not even been 
possible to have a single generally accepted purpose for competition law 
 
 
39  Restrictive Business Practices chapter (Chapter V), whose objective was to prevent 
business practices that restrain competition and adversely affect international trade. 
40  See e.g. Toye (2012). 
41  The ITO charter was signed in Havanna in 1948 during a UN Conference on Trade 
and Employment, but faced problems with its ratification. Ultimately, it was blocked 
by the US Congress and the ITO never became what it was envisioned to be.  
42  Officially decided by the WTO General Council in August 2004. WTO (2004). 
43  Hoekman (2011). 
44  Bhattacharjea (2006), p. 297. 
45  Ibid., pp. 296–297. 
46  The Andean Community consists of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru and its 
Commission Decision 608 regulates free competition within the territory of one or 
more members by prohibiting and sanctioning restraints in competition affecting the 
region. 
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recognized, but rather several exist, spanning from protecting consumers to 
furthering foreign policy in the arena of international politics.47  
A traditional explanation may be found in the doctrinal difference across the 
Atlantic Ocean, where on the one hand the American Chicago School has 
advocated for a narrow way to measure consumer welfare mainly on price 
increases only, while the EU tends to incorporate internal market goals as well as 
elements of fairness in its review in ensuring functioning markets.48 Today, in a 
more pluralist existence of international antitrust, one could refer to there being 
‘too many cooks in the kitchen’, given that over 130 nations have enacted 
competition law.49 Also, Bradford argues that most younger competition regimes 
have adopted EU-style competition legislation and by doing so, have allowed for a 
broader mandate for their agencies – all of which leads to divergence.50 This is a 
fair argument – particularly in comparison with US antitrust, since EU competition 
law’s praxis does more commonly consider a broader set of ways to ensure 
competitive markets, some of which could perhaps be excessively extended to 
address non-competition concerns. 
The past decade has been paradoxical. Save for the COVID-19 pandemic, 
global trade continues to increase, reaching new heights in terms of trade volume, 
but also in terms of trade agreements entered into.51 Most of these trade agreements 
are agreed bilaterally between two nations. Concurrently, serious efforts to bring 
about international competition rules have not been undertaken. Instead, the focus 
has been on incremental convergence through voluntary information sharing and 
creating trust.52 The ICN has been (and still is) the main forum in which said 
advances have taken place. Perhaps harmonized competition rules are not even 
desirable.53 However, one might wonder if the current trend of modest 
developments results from a consideration that this is the optimal way forward or 
due to it having been the only conceivable alternative for any change at all. As 
early as 2010, Sweeney was already argueing against voluntary convergence as a 
viable long-term avenue, but rather a more interim compromise, although differing 
views also exist.54  
Historically, a key challenge for harmonization has been the US and the EU 
being unwilling to compromise on their own positions – inter alia in WTO 
 
 
47  See e.g. Dabbah 2010, pp. 36–44. 
48  See e.g. Bradford et al. (2019), p. 7–11. 
49  Supra 62 
50  Ibid, p. 32–33. 
51  WTO (2019). 
52  Gerber (2010), p. 111; Ristaniemi (2018). 
53  See e.g. Bradford (2010). 
54  Sweeney (2010), pp. 9–11. 
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negotiations.55 This is perhaps partly due to the assumption of being more 
advanced in competition law and policy, but also owing to leverage they have had 
in influencing their trading partners on bilateral and extraterritorial bases. Their 
reluctance to find common ground with other nations can be seen to have led 
‘developing countries’ to form a bloc that acted as a counterweight in said WTO 
negotiations.56 This dichotomy became entrenched where mutual trust was at low 
levels. 
Comity provisions provide a fitting example of the multi-faceted past of 
initiatives attempting to improve international antitrust cooperation. It is a general 
principle of international law, the aim of which is that the jurisdiction with 
enforcement capabilities will take another jurisdiction’s interests into 
consideration. In international antitrust, the most common variant is negative 
comity, which is limited to avoiding actively harming the said other jurisdiction’s 
important interests in its enforcement.57 Only positive comity arrangements entail 
that a nation could request another to enforce suspected anticompetitive conduct on 
its behalf. Positive comity is rare, but not nonexistent.58 Export cartels are a 
notorious example of difficulties in extraterritorially enforcing one’s competition 
law, and the current comity arrangements are not sufficient to bridge this gap. 
A more encouraging example concerns waivers of confidentiality. This is a 
useful tool for competition agencies, in particular, but also often for firms – at least 
in merger cases. The ability for agencies to share information shortens their review 
time and allows for greater consistency across jurisdictions, while maintaining the 
confidentiality of the material received. Confidentiality waivers are used by many 
competition agencies, particularly in merger cases, but also in cartel infringement 
cases.59 Encouragement of confidentiality waivers as well as the development of 
globally standardized, yet not inflexible, templates for such waivers has been stated 
in soft law documents of the ICN, the ECN, and the OECD alike.60 As such, they 
are an active tool within international antitrust. This example shows that difficulties 
in cooperating are not necessarily intransient or all-encompassing. 
An important point to bear in mind is that until rather recently very few nations 
have had actual, codified, competition law. Historically, international antitrust was 
largely the extraterritorial application of US antitrust, with a bit of EU and 
 
 
55  Gerber (2010), p. 103–106. 
56  Bhattacharjea (2006). 
57  OECD (2015). 
58  See e.g. US – European Communities 1998 Agreement on applying positive comity 
principles in the enforcement of their competition laws. 
59  ICN (2005), p. 2; ICN (2007), p. 11. 
60  OECD (2014B), Chapter VII; ICN (2016), X. A. Comment 2; and ECN (2011), p. 6. 
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Japanese competition law involved, on occasion.61 In 1990, only 16 jurisdictions 
globally had a competition authority.62 This has since significantly changed. Along 
with spreading international trade liberalization, competition law and its inherent 
welfare-enhancing benefits are ever more widely recognized. Today, over 130 
nations have some form of competition legislation and an authority enforcing it.63  
There are likely several reasons for this increase. First, it has become common 
to include a chapter on competition matters in bilateral trade agreements.64 Said 
chapters are usually not subject to the agreed dispute resolution mechanism, but 
arguably still have some effect in signaling the expectations of the contracting 
nations – thus invoking action.65 Second, it is likely that mutual understanding and 
trust between more mature competition jurisdictions and younger ones has 
improved.66 The ICN has been instrumental in enabling the sharing of best 
practices. Its key benefit is that it focuses on the operative level: its main 
participants are officials of competition authorities, thus leaving politics at the 
door. Also, although having originally been an initiative of the US, Canada, and the 
EU, said regimes do not dominate discussion or other ICN activities. Finally, the 
preference of major powers inevitably has an impact. Aydin argues that simply the 
coercion of major economic powers – the EU and the US specifically – might 
actually be the single most significant factor that has led to the increase.67 
The increase in competition legislation and enforcers alters the status quo by 
adding complexity – in turn elevating the problems resulting from the 
fragmentation and inconsistency of international antitrust. Particularly for firms 
operating international businesses, navigating the current landscape is challenging 
due to the administrative burden of having to consider a multitude of varying 
jurisdictions and enduring the added risk of potential conflicts in competition 
authorities’ decisions.68 
Dialogue within international antitrust has often been surprisingly detached 
from more general trends and discourse in international law. Antitrust literature 
appears to operate within its own realm or, at most, borrows thinking from 
neighboring fields, such as intellectual property or trade law more generally. This 
detachment is however not uncommon within international law, which is 
notoriously fragmented into so-called expert regimes, as will be further discussed 
 
 
61  Gerber (2010), pp. 205–208. 
62  OECD (2014A), pp. 22–23. 
63  Ibid. 
64  Sokol (2008A). 
65  Ibid.  
66  Coppola et. al. (2020).  
67  Aydin (2010). 
68  See e.g. Ristaniemi (2014). 
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in Chapter 5.69 The following section will build on this historical account by 
elaborating on what the current state of affairs is. 
2.3 Status quo 
The convergence of national competition law and enforcement appears to continue 
to be the primary goal of international competition cooperation.70 This is done, in 
particular, under the auspices of various organizations facilitating voluntary 
cooperation, including the ICN, the OECD, and the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development (UNCTAD). Secondarily, increased inter-agency dialogue 
and coordination is also encouraged, in order to reduce procedural overlaps and 
other inefficiencies.71 The preference for voluntary cooperation is likely due to the 
desire to avoid discussions about the potential sovereignty-reducing effects of a 
more binding way of cooperating. 
There are weak signals of voluntary cooperation reaching new heights, 
particularly within the ICN. While the current – now established – ways of working 
continue, the ICN has begun to produce so-called Framework instruments, which 
operate based on an opt-in basis.72 While still non-binding even for those who have 
opted in, the impact of the mechanism is arguably stronger than ordinary voluntary 
cooperation. This type of approach may help steer development and convergence in 
a certain direction. Stakeholder reactions appear to be positive – inter alia, 
organizations such as the Association of Corporate Counsel, the International 
Chamber of Commerce, the Association of In-House Competition Lawyers, and the 
U.S. Council for International Business all support the ICN’s latest Framework on 
due process.73  
Despite the success of voluntary cooperation, the status quo is, however, not 
without problems. On the contrary, due to increasing international trade, there is 
more business taking place that simultaneously affects several jurisdictions. This 
trend is underscored by the significant global influence of digital platforms and the 
underlying digital economy that transcends national frontiers.74 Further, the 
prevalence of competition laws and authorities means that there are also ever more 
jurisdictions whose competition laws may simultaneously apply and whose laws 
may be enforced simultaneously, including extraterritorially.  
 
 
69  Koskenniemi & Leino (2002), p. 553; and Koskenniemi (2007). 
70  Supra 52. 
71  Ibid. 
72  ICN (2019). 
73  United States Council for International Business (2019). 
74  See e-g. Nuccio & Guerzoni (2019). 
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The increase in jurisdictions with competition law and enforcers is – in itself – 
a positive development, but not unconditionally. International antitrust has 
traditionally been dominated by American and European voices. This traditional 
dichotomy is already becoming broader, with regimes such as Brazil and Canada 
making interesting and relevant contributions.75 However, along with this increase 
in regimes with active views on antitrust increases in the complexity and difficulty 
for the primary market actor, the firm, to operate. The status quo is thus one of 
both substantial and procedural inconsistency, which leads to unpredictability for 
businesses as well as economic inefficiency in general.  
Examples of problematic gaps and overlaps are numerous and diverse. One 
could highlight definition issues, such as those concerning joint ventures. Some 
jurisdictions differentiate joint ventures with a more independent nature (also 
known as “full-function”)76 from other cooperation relationships, while other 
jurisdictions do not.77 Also, expected firm conduct varies, as is clear from the 
diverging views on how to enforce conduct in a very strong market position. Some 
jurisdictions impose significant obligations to avoid exploiting its stakeholders,78 
while others do not.79 Further, most jurisdictions allow export cartels as well as 
grant state aid either without restriction or even with the express purpose of 
improving their firms’ foreign business.80 These last two points where competition 
law is effectively excluded represent major gaps. All of this – both collectively and 
individually – creates true harm to business, which in turn hinders the efficiency of 
the international trading system. 
Extraterritorial application of national competition law is a crude way of 
unilaterally trying to patch the gap created by allowing export cartels. Such an 
approach creates collateral damage by creating problems of its own, exacerbated by 
the drastic increase in competition regimes, which oftentimes adopt similar 
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approaches. The status quo represents a significant coordination problem and calls 
for an update on the systemic and international level.  
The growing influence of China, in particular, is noteworthy. Quite the 
newcomer to competition law – and to market economy more generally – China 
has the potential to alter the traditional power balance of international antitrust 
cooperation. Particularly China’s insistence of retaining strong reservations for 
considering its industry policy is a point of divergence, compared to the other 
major economic powers: the EU and the US.81 Ng argues that an underlying reason 
for this lies in its markedly more state-centered approach in comparison with most 
competition regimes that are consumer-centered.82 Should it so desire, China could 
leverage its influence to improve the legitimacy for such reservations. This would 
likely see support in a number of developing countries, which could create a 
significant counterweight.83  
Despite the shortcomings in the current state of affairs, there does not, 
however, seem to be much appetite for change. Convergence is taking place 
through information sharing and national competition authorities are gaining 
experience and capacity, but the developments and plans of major powers and the 
main international organizations going forward appear largely incremental and 
technical in nature.84 Nothing transformational is in sight.  
There are likely several reasons for this. One of them is a dearth of sufficient 
data. The assumed negative effects associated with export cartels provides an 
example where competing doctrinal research arguing the opposite leads to a 
stalemate in the absence of convincing empirical data.85 Perhaps the most crucial 
reason, however, is that none of the three major economic powers – the EU, the 
US, and China – seem to be pushing for true improvement in international antitrust 
cooperation.  
Also, the US does not currently favor multilateral cooperation – as a general 
policy approach – and is instead more inward-looking and in favor of bilateralism 
in its foreign affairs.86 China’s competition law and related agencies only 
celebrated ten years of existence in 2018 and have focused more on capacity 
building than international cooperation, which has thus far mostly been reactive. 
Last, the EU is clearly open to – even deep – multilateral cooperation, but is not 
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forceful about it, which may be a pragmatic strategic choice – perhaps due to a lack 
of sufficient support from its member states.  
As mentioned in the Introduction, the international antitrust system is 
fragmented. Its individual fragments consist of national competition law regimes 
which are complemented by soft law – guidelines and ‘best practice’ 
recommendations. Soft law can be defined as “nonbinding rules or instruments that 
interpret or inform our understanding of binding legal rules or represent promises 
that in turn create expectations about future conduct.”87 International law easily 
overlooks soft law – the focus instead tends to be on treaties and customary law 
(such as the lex mercatoria).88 However, as Guzman argues, soft law can have 
meaning.  
Using a rational actor model as the underlying premise in a reputational model 
of international law, Guzman’s research describes how nations value their 
international reputation to help them achieve a variety of policy objectives, which 
de facto leads them to put effort into compliance with international soft law – even 
if it is de jure voluntary – in order to uphold this reputation.89 “By developing and 
preserving a good reputation, states are able to extract greater concessions for their 
promises in the future.”90 Said impact is, however, not evenly distributed, but 
rather likely greatly depends on the subject matter in question. Guzman further 
argues that compliance can be particularly pronounced in economic and regulatory 
matters, in comparison with matters more fundamental to a nation.91 That is, within 
the realm of international antitrust, soft law can have true significance. 
Interestingly, competition law may actually be less controversial at an 
international level than domestically. Gerber argues about an inherent domestic 
conflict between constitutional law and competition law. While the former aims to 
preserve a certain state of affairs, the latter aims at ensuring market conditions 
allow for disruption and improvements – that is change. This conflict is absent in 
the international context and sheds light on an interesting benefit within antitrust at 
the international level.92 
In any case, a baseline of the desirability of international cooperation within 
antitrust can be established, given the level of active participation both in the 
relevant multilateral organizations – the ICN, the OECD, and UNCTAD – as well 
as bilaterally, as mentioned in Chapter 1 (Introduction). International cooperation 
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is, as such, arguably beneficial for society at large, as long as distributional and 
allocation issues can be addressed. The extreme alternative to cooperation would 
lead to the same inefficiencies and non-tariff boundaries that have widely been 
discussed within a trade context. That said, total harmonization easily restricts a 
nation’s sovereignty and is an insensitive approach towards nations’ differing 
economic situations.  
Cooperation does not necessarily need to lead to harmonization, nor to 
coherence, but it should increase the consistency of international antitrust. There is 
much discourse about coherence in law.93 Normative coherence in law can be 
defined as the consistency and logic at a deep level of legal principles, objectives, 
and related underlying values.94 At a more superficial level, consistency in law can 
be seen to refer to the absence of conflicts between legal rules and norms.95 While 
total coherence – that of an entire legal system – is rarely considered possible in 
modern times, local coherence – coherence of or within a legal regime, such as 
antitrust – might be worth pursuing, albeit challenging to achieve.96  
In the case of international antitrust, coherence might even constitute a 
paradox. Inherent internal conflict is unavoidable in such a system of diverse 
sovereign nations combined with competing international organizations – a regime 
complex as discussed in Chapter 5 – and with differing underlying goals and 
values. Wilhelmsson argues that a prerequisite for normative coherence is a belief 
in common values.97 This is clearly lacking in international antitrust. However, this 
is not to say that local coherence within international antitrust is not worth 
pursuing. In fact, the convergence of international antitrust in recent decades 
represents an increase in de facto local coherence.  
It is relevant to consider what the aim of cooperation should be, and future 
endeavors would be wise to base cooperation on an appreciation of a pluralist and 
increasingly polycentric world and to build on it, rather than disregard it. The 
challenge and opportunity is to optimize cooperation, both in terms of substance 
and structure, at its different levels. In this regard, it is worth specifying the main 
dimension in which cooperation takes place, as illustrated below. 
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Figure 2.  Approximating international antitrust cooperation potential. 
Cooperation in international antitrust is often of a normative nature. Both 
intergovernmental and transgovernmental cooperation leads to the creation of 
norms and standards, whether explicitly or more implicitly. Historically, 
harmonization attempts have arguably emphasized substantive questions – mostly 
intergovernmentally. This route has faced challenges, as described above in Section 
2.2, thus leading to transgovernmental network-based cooperation. Now that trust 
and mutual understanding have increased, as has the number of nations with 
competition regimes, the time might be right to begin shifting the emphasis 
towards more structured coordination, which has particular potential concerning 
procedural issues. 
A key challenge of antitrust is efficient enforcement, especially in cross-border 
relations. This is exacerbated by the inherent characteristics of the digital economy 
with which competition law enforcement struggles more broadly.98 The digital 
economy and the platforms that dominate it are particularly international in nature. 
This demands more cooperation from NCAs but also concurrently presents an 
opportunity for a reform of international antitrust. Such reform could well harness 
technological tools, such as those that some enforcers have implemented or are 
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planning to implement,99 but also could unlock potential through increased 
transgovernmental coordination and cooperation.  
2.4 Overview of literature and existing debate 
Competition law and policy is commonly a domestic affair. It is framed around the 
economic activity occurring within the territory of nation-states, with the notable 
exception of the EU. This notwithstanding, international antitrust – in some shape 
or form – has been around for as long as international trade. Most antitrust 
literature concerns the functioning of domestic regulation or its enforcement. 
Nevertheless, much has also been written about international antitrust.  
In general, scholarship on international antitrust tends to focus on rather narrow 
areas. There are a few authors with a more comprehensive view. Particularly 
valuable contributions aiding synthesizing international antitrust have been made 
by Eleanor M. Fox, David J. Gerber, Andrew T. Guzman, Daniel D. Sokol, and 
Brendan J. Sweeney.  
History and tradition in antitrust provide an interesting viewpoint. Gerber 
studies the impact of the US and the EU competition law traditions and their effects 
on international antitrust. Gerber is – in comparison with his peers – particularly 
vocal about the lack of historical understanding of those participating in or advising 
on international antitrust development.100 He puts forth the argument that 
enhancing this understanding could – in turn – improve the quality of the efforts 
exerted towards creating a better antitrust world order.101 This is an interesting and 
valuable point.  
Gerber examines two prominent strategies of international antitrust: extending 
a nation’s sovereignty, and convergence. Historically, extending the reach of one’s 
competition law has been the primary manifestation of international antitrust.102 
This concerned the US, in particular, and was the modus operandi at a point in time 
when most nations lacked competition law.103 Extraterritorial application of 
competition law both further empowered its own domestic enforcement as well as 
helped avoid an antitrust ‘race to the bottom’. The US was, in a way and to a 
degree, the global enforcement agency and US antitrust law was global antitrust 
law.104 Against this backdrop, it is clear that reaching a multilateral binding 
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agreement on substantive matters – inevitably also involving compromises for the 
US – has been a challenge.  
During the past decades, literary activity seems to have coincided with WTO 
activity. Accordingly, the last burst of publications was in the early 2000s when 
competition matters were still on the WTO’s negotiation agenda. Unsurprisingly, 
much of the commentary is linked to the proposals brought forth there and 
concerning the appropriate structuring of multilateral international antitrust.  
In absence of being able to agree on de jure binding international antitrust 
obligations, de facto voluntary convergence became the new strategy. This can be 
seen as a beneficial, if only interim, resolution, as added mutual understanding and 
trust likely provide the most utility as a path towards something more instead of 
being an end in themselves, as Sweeney notes.105 A proponent of the creation of a 
multilaterally set system of hard competition law is Guzman. His research argues 
that the WTO is the most appropriate forum, particularly given its pre-existing 
history of multilateral agreements (such as TRIPs) and the established dispute 
resolution mechanism.106 
Gerber argues that a broad multilateral agreement consisting of binding 
obligations is desirable, but that would require first finding a normative consensus 
on both the goals and the means to reach them.107 Concerning enforcement, 
Stephan argues that any international organization commissioned to enforce or 
resolve disputes of an international antitrust system would inevitably result in high 
agency costs, given that its principals – the member nations of said organization – 
are themselves in conflict about the substance of optimal competition policy and 
would thus be unable to provide a sufficiently clear mandate.108  
Norms and standards within international antitrust, however, do exist. Fox and 
Trebilcock have synthesized nine different studies with the aim of understanding 
whether there are global competition-related norms, particularly procedural ones.109 
This focus is important, as research on convergence may easily excessively 
emphasize substantive questions only, while leaving procedural convergence as a 
secondary priority. Their findings indicate that there is a “remarkable degree of 
consensus on the basic procedural requirements and institutional performance 
norms of competition law institutions”.110 This promising observation should 
warrant greater effort on multilateral agreements concerning procedural matters 
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specifically. Also, looking at the perspective of major economic powers – the EU, 
the US, and China – it seems that procedural developments are more plausible than 
substantive ones.111  
Voluntary cooperation has its proponents. Fox favors cooperation based on 
networks as the primary way forward. While she does not forego the idea of a 
multilateral agreement, she argues that many matters of incoherence in 
international antitrust can be resolved by easier means.112 The principle of 
subsidiarity – meaning that competence should be delegated to international or 
supranational levels only where it is beneficial and not by default – is key in this 
respect. It is one of the core tenets in the EU,113 but also useful as a principle 
elsewhere. However, Fox argues that competition distortions either by nations or 
condoned by them, such as export cartels, do require a supranational resolution in 
order to be minimized.114  
Bradford prefers voluntary cooperation, not as a second-best alternative, but as 
the de facto most effective way to bring about convergence and coherence.115 This 
approach seems rooted in pragmatism – given the plethora of well-documented 
reasons for why prior attempts towards harmonized substantive competition law 
and enforcement have failed,116 it would seem reasonable to propose creating a 
common foundation on a non-binding basis. This has indeed also been and 
continues to be the main path for most of the 2000s. However, as the dissertation 
has described above, today’s circumstances have changed.117 A multilateral 
agreement would not necessarily need to concern setting uniform substantive 
competition provisions, as these are largely similar in most parts of the world. 
Instead, a treaty could bring benefits in reducing enforcement problems – whether 
due to overlaps, gaps, or coordination issues. 
The merits for deepening international antitrust generally and employing a 
primary strategy of de facto convergence for doing so can, however, be debated. 
First, what should be considered an ‘improvement’. This was already discussed in 
Chapter 1.2 and – as mentioned – convergence may lead to less policy 
experimentation,118 and the current hegemony of EU-inspired competition law 
worldwide may falsely promote legitimizing the taking of non-competition issues 
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into consideration in competition law.119 Further, as mentioned in Chapter 2, 
convergence may face limits in an increasingly polycentric world of antitrust, given 
the increasing influence of other nations than the transatlantic duo of the US and 
the EU.  
Gerber presents five questions that are central to the advancement of 
international antitrust: 
– How to design a strategy that minimizes harm to global competition, 
when the landscape is partially different and more complex than national 
jurisdictions. 
– How to harness the wealth of American competition law experience and 
its community without having to adopt American approaches, as such. 
– The value of the European experience in creating national competition 
laws and reconciling them with supranational regulation. 
– Understanding the relationships between nation-states, international 
organizations and global governance networks. 
– Ensuring that global competition is allowed in ways that benefit all, and 
not only some, participants.120 
The main legal problems causing inefficiencies, such as extraterritorial application 
of competition law, overlapping multiple procedural filing requirements, and 
exempting export cartels from competition law, are not novel. Foundational issues 
concern establishing legitimacy under international law on the one hand, and the 
practical enforcement challenges on the other. In terms of the former, unilateral 
extraterritorial application is linked to the ‘territoriality principle’ inasmuch as a 
certain act affects a certain territory, although opposition does exist.121  
A nation has an innate desire to protect the economic wellbeing of its citizens, 
which can be seen to create needed legitimacy in the eyes of a state’s legislator to 
enact law allowing such extraterritorialism.122 Allowing the extraterritorial 
application of a nation’s competition law is often a response to export cartel 
activity – conduct that is generally not prohibited in the nation in which it 
originates, in the absence of domestic detrimental effects. Export cartels are a 
prime example of the sub-optimal state of international antitrust on several levels. 
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A key unresolved issue with regard to export cartels is, however, the gravity of 
their harmful effects, which is difficult to quantify exactly.123  
Extraterritorial enforcement generally requires the cooperation of another 
nation – and comity arrangements exist for seeking such support – however, 
procuring such cooperation is challenging in practice. Positive comity 
arrangements have been developed – in part – to help mitigate this, but they are not 
as widespread as their negative variant and their de facto impact is dubious.124 The 
question of how to either improve the enforcement of the extraterritorial 
application of competition law or – alternatively – reduce the need for said 
application is unresolved and is linked to the general variety of views on how 
international antitrust should be organized.  
National economies differ significantly and often perspectives emphasize the 
reality of wealthy nations. Certain authors have published excellent pieces to help 
understand the interests of developing countries and how this influences 
competition policy and its international dimensions. These include Bhattacharjea, 
who sheds light on the position of developing countries when participating in the 
international stage of trade and competition.125 Their interests may be radically 
contrasting to those of the US-EU duo in particular. Fox has also made important 
contributions in this area. Her work has highlighted the legitimacy of said differing 
interests from the perspective of developing countries.126 Stiglitz elaborates on the 
utility of ‘public interest’ considerations as a part of competition policy, 
particularly concerning lesser developed nations, and recognizes that such concerns 
are well justified on occasion.127 Further, Lianos describes the role of the United 
Nations, above all the UNCTAD, in helping such nations get on the path of 
competition policy and related law.128 Indeed, UNCTAD’s impact is arguably 
particularly pronounced concerning less-developed regimes – certainly a 
complementary function for those nations excluded from the OECD. 
As can be seen in the above literature review, the general approach that legal 
scholars have taken with regard to international antitrust leaves room for further 
research. An idealist and formalist approach might emphasize resolving gaps and 
overlaps of the current fragmented system by creating some kind of internationally 
uniform legal order that is enforced by some kind of supranational enforcer. On the 
other hand, a more pragmatic and incremental approach would acknowledge 
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certain practical limitations and instead might continue to rely on voluntary 
cooperation to do what it can to reduce friction. Looking at existing literature, 
perhaps its main focus was a necessary first step, commenting on the need to 
improve the status quo, and one that helps lead to more nuanced and indirect 
proposals, such as those elaborated as a part of this dissertation. 
It can be argued that much has changed since the last wave of scholarly 
literature in the field in the early 2000s. First, the amount of hard competition law 
in this world has drastically increased: today over 130 nations have enacted 
domestic competition law, compared to 16 as recently as 1990, as mentioned in 
Section 2.2. Second, the amount of soft competition law has also drastically 
increased, in two particular ways: competition chapters are now commonplace in 
bilateral trade agreements, and de facto international cooperation has significantly 
increased – particularly within the ICN, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(ICC), the OECD, and also UNCTAD – which has resulted in an increased number 
of documents listing and describing various recommended practices.  
A key question in deepening cooperation to include binding obligations is 
ensuring that the system is fair and sensible to those involved. All in all, trust has 
arguably increased. However, Stephan argues that any meaningful wealth 
redistribution as a part of an international antitrust system – a mechanism often 
referenced as necessary to achieve it – is doomed to fail.129 If Hans Rosling and the 
United Nations statistics he cites are correct, the economic divide between so-
called developing and developed countries is not as wide as it once was.130 The 
problem is no longer a dearth of competition law to regulate international business 
or how the EU and the US can ‘educate’ developing nations to think as they do. It 
is rather how to improve coherence in ways that both respect the sovereignty and 
national preferences of all nations and concurrently help minimize negative 
externalities. This is also the niche that this dissertation seeks to address. 
Efforts to promote compliance have become increasingly important in the 
current paradigm. The editorial work of Paha in Competition Law Compliance 
Programmes: An Interdisciplinary Approach, which explores the theme in a very 
interdisciplinary fashion, is important in this field.131 Sokol has also contributed 
several key articles on the topic.132 Also, Finell has assessed how to affect 
corporate compliance conduct in relation to the telecommunications market in her 
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doctoral dissertation.133 Competition compliance literature taps into general 
literature about compliance and creating cultures of compliance. In this respect, the 
work of Langevoort has been particularly useful.134 More generally, works in the 
fields of behavioral economics, such as Kahnemann and Tversky135, and in 
psychology, such as Paruzel et al.136, are significant in understanding how to affect 
and influence conduct. 
It is also useful to look beyond competition law and into approaches employed 
in other areas of law and policy that operate in a similarly international 
environment. Areas such as environmental law and human rights norms are 
particularly worth exploring, since, first, our planet’s environment is one we share 
irrespective of nation-state nationality and, second – if not otherwise, human rights 
questions often tie into global value chains, whose effects span several 
jurisdictions. While no silver bullet, they might have the potential to inspire 
initiatives within international antitrust.  
In combating climate change, a common challenge affecting us all, a key 
multilateral effort has manifested itself through treaties, the latest of which being 
the Paris Accord.137 These efforts have been taken under the auspices of the UN 
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) that entered into force in 
1994. in other words, embracing the traditional treaty-based approach of 
international relations requiring intergovernmental consensus and, consequently 
given the plurality of views, one with a weak enforcement mechanism. Despite its 
shortcomings, the UNFCCC has created a foundation upon which further 
cooperation may be built and also has been built. Nothing similarly fundamental 
exists in the realm of competition or antitrust. 
For a mostly different, but similarly fundamental example, one can turn to the 
UN Global Compact. It is a non-hierarchical corporate responsibility initiative 
which attempts to improve environment and human rights matters by way of 
creating voluntary global standards for firms. Its core consists of ten broad, but also 
quite vague, principles. Although administered by the United Nations, the main 
actors in the Global Compact are firms, which – if participating in the initiative – 
are required to publicly advocate for the Global Compact and annually report on 
how its principles have been implemented.138 And firms truly are participating – 
around ten thousand firms have signed up from over 160 nations since its launch in 
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2000, since then producing over sixty four thousand reports.139 Although criticism 
of inefficiency exists,140 it has incrementally increased the importance of corporate 
responsibility matters in firms by giving added impetus to implement such 
measures and a path in which to direct focus. In the absence of binding obligations, 
the power of the Global Compact is in its transparency as well as in the trickle-
down effect of buy-in by leading multinational firms who then have often required 
their suppliers follow suit.141  
In general, it appears that two trends in public governance jointly form a 
particularly pronounced shift from the prior status quo – also in the antitrust 
universe. The first being that domestic policymakers have begun to better 
accommodate other stakeholders through models of shared governance.142 This is a 
departure from the traditional ‘governing by government’ and ‘command-and-
control’ models. Second, the proliferation of interaction and cooperation 
specifically at the transgovernmental level, in addition to and – at times – also 
instead of intergovernmental cooperation.143 This is evident within international 
antitrust by looking at the activity of organizations such as the ICN, which 
primarily consists of officials of competition agencies. These trends and theories 
shall be addressed in further detail in Chapter 5 in order to deduce what they could 
contribute towards international antitrust. 
A third noteworthy trend is that of sustainability and its impact on both public 
policy and international cooperation. As the climate crisis accelerates, discussion is 
ongoing in many areas concerning whether planetary boundaries can be better 
respected. Various angles are being brought up to mitigate the danger, including 
repositioning the market economy and the role of firms in ways that better 
encourage sustainability.144 Antitrust, as the guardian of functioning markets, and 
its role in the battle for improved sustainability is a hot topic. Examples include the 
fact that it has been recognized that fierce competition may not lead to sustainable 
products and services, and that restrictions on horizontal cooperation may hinder 
the ability of industries to agree on more sustainable, albeit more costly practices or 
raw materials.145 The key question is how to include non-price parameters, such as 
planetary boundaries and sustainability, into a consumer welfare test and how to 
quantify the negative externalities of unsustainable practices. What is clear is that 
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there is international momentum for finding a more sustainable equilibrium for the 
role of business in society and one which is likely to affect contemporary antitrust 
– as well as the market economy by-and-large. 
In the light of previous literature, the topic of creating a harmonized 
international antitrust system is quite well covered. It seems dubious, at best, 
whether a broad substantive harmonization of competition norms would serve a 
beneficial purpose in practice. However, that is not to say that the current state of 
affairs is optimal or even satisfactory. Nor does it mean that further cooperation 
and approximation is undesirable. As mentioned above, the paradigm has changed, 
which calls for a reevaluation of the appropriate means for improving international 
antitrust. This dissertation both identifies and analyzes existing problems and the 
challenges concerning why they continue to exist. Further, as will be further 
discussed in Chapter 5, opportunities exist to better formalize transnational 
networks as well as allowing firms a larger role in antitrust governance and 
enforcement that avoid the sticking points of prior attempts towards improvements. 
 
 33 
3 Methodological Framework 
3.1 Research methods 
Researching international antitrust can resemble looking through a kaleidoscope. 
The present state and future outlook alike depend on the configuration chosen. In 
the context of this dissertation, the configuration refers to the chosen analytical 
framework and methodological choices. These effectively constitute the way in 
which the research is designed to answer the research questions that were posed in 
Section 1.2.146 
The dissertation and the articles that form its backbone are grounded in 
pragmatism. In practice, this translates into analytical eclecticism – an approach 
where research methods may be mixed to the extent that the research questions 
demand, while still preserving the integrity of the research work itself.147 As an 
article-based work, a number of methodologies are employed and they vary 
depending on the article – in ways described in the following paragraphs of this 
Section.  
While this allows flexibility, such analytical eclecticism does present a risk of 
incoherence within the dissertation and which has called for additional attention in 
the synthesizing sections to come. Nevertheless, such pluralism is generally 
considered a benefit within the social sciences.148 Some generalizations can, 
however, and – for the sake of clarity – will be made. I shall present these and then 
elaborate further on an article by article basis. 
The research of this dissertation is of a doctrinal nature. Doctrinal research can 
be defined as research that “aims to give a systematic exposition of the principles, 
rules and concepts governing a particular legal field or institution and analyses the 
relationship between these principles, rules and concepts with a view to solving 
unclarities and gaps in the existing law”.149 Hutchinson argues that doctrinal 
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research is about “a constant search for legal coherence”.150 As such, the work 
attempts to both collate and bring clarity to the various strands that collectively 
make up the de facto global antitrust order.  
There is animated ongoing debate about the state of doctrinal legal research.151 
This is perhaps best exemplified by the contrasting views within the Posner family. 
Eric Posner has famously argued that “doctrinal legal research is dead” – a 
reference to the idea that legal scholars should engage in more interdisciplinary 
work, such as law-in-context research.152 By contrast, his father, Judge Richard 
Posner, argues that doctrinal research is “important for the vitality of the legal 
system and of greater value than much esoteric interdisciplinary legal 
scholarship”.153 One would think that there are contributions to be made by both, 
and excessively appreciating narrow convictions to legal research might be the 
most harmful. Be this how it may, doctrinal research has been and appears to still 
be the generally prevailing research method of choice for legal scholars.154  
Indeed, the doctrinal method is relevant and suitable for the research questions 
of this dissertation. In the absence of a fully codified, command-and-control based 
system, international antitrust is not without norms. On the contrary, a plethora of 
norms and standards exist that can be attributed to it, some of which are mentioned 
as examples in Chapter 1. The resulting normative framework in its entirety is 
obscure and ambiguous – an invitation for dogmatic research. 
A core element and function of this dissertation is that it systematizes present 
law (lex lata).155 In this context, law refers to the entirety of the norms and 
standards that collectively form international antitrust. The chosen approach does 
not presuppose that such norms and standards are exclusively international in 
nature, but rather that some may concurrently apply in national jurisdictions 
domestically. The dissertation also argues that international antitrust not only 
exists, but fits in well with contemporary international governance discourse, as 
well as seeks to make sense of its composition, as is discussed further in Chapter 5.  
It is said that by undertaking systematization, legal research is able to aid with 
the coherence of the law itself.156 It is thus descriptive.157 Jeremy Bentham has 
described this sort of approach as ‘expository jurisprudence’, since it sheds light on 
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what the law is, including its interrelations.158 However, it is for the researcher to 
decide the manner in which such exposure is done, including what to emphasize 
and what angle to take.  
Partially also going beyond merely systematizing, the dissertation crosses into 
the realm of prescriptive jurisprudence. It attempts to help develop improvements 
to the current system – what law ought to be like (lege ferenda).159 Smits argues 
that the ‘ultimate question of legal science’ is what the law ought to be. This is 
explained as that the legal discipline should reflect ‘upon what it is that individuals, 
firms, states and other organizations ought to do or ought to refrain from doing’.160 
It is fitting, then, that this is the second core function of this dissertation.  
More specifically, the dissertation aims to contribute to improving the 
substance of competition law – particularly by proposing ways to better enable a 
system of shared governance and advancing structured transgovernmentalism. 
Approaching this task is done with a ‘law in context’ angle – the dissertation is 
linked to competition policy analysis in that it attempts to consider the multitude of 
policy tools in achieving ‘what ought to be’ – not only what positive law can 
achieve.161  
Each article is at least in part either about what the current state of affairs ought 
to be like or analyzes what possibilities there may be for law becoming what it 
ought to be. The aims of descriptive and prescriptive legal research are however 
not unrelated, but rather de facto quite interconnected. In order to propose reforms, 
significant amounts of doctrinal legal research must be undertaken to ascertain the 
current state of affairs. Hutchinson rightly states that ‘the lawyer needs to 
commence any legal discussion by using this method to critically determine “what 
the law is.”’162 
The work approaches its core functions in an argumentative manner. Smits 
argues rightly that views differ on both how to regulate societal matters and also 
what the content should be.163 Thus, legal science is not about finding a solution as 
much as it is about ideas and the possible advances and drawbacks of such ideas.164 
This is combined in this dissertation with a problem-based approach,165 which 
begins with identifying and framing issues and then moving on to identifying 
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alternatives for improvement and, finally, proposing an appropriate one – given the 
realistic possibilities.166  
The first and second article employ a largely problem-based approach – they 
are concerned with legal problems and how these are treated.167 They provide 
examples of problems and general context about the inefficiencies of international 
antitrust.  
An important segment of the dissertation concerns how major economic 
powers approach cooperation in competition matters. The third article takes on an 
additional element of political discourse analysis, in the form of analyzing political 
rhetoric from the selected major powers: the US, the EU, and China. The purpose 
is to ultimately identify factors that affect what kind of alternatives for improving 
international antitrust are possible, and – as a result – also understand what kinds of 
alternatives are clearly not practically possible. To analyze the dynamics that affect 
this requires an understanding of international politics and the balance of economic 
power between these powers. 
The fourth article, which is on incentivizing firms to put more effort into 
competition compliance, benefits from work in several fields beyond legal studies. 
Perspectives from psychology and economics – particularly those of behavioral 
economics – are put to use in understanding what impacts decision-making within 
firms. Such understanding is critical for suggesting possible ways of improving 
how firms approach compliance with competition law. This added 
multidisciplinary dimension can be described as adding a meta-legal perspective to 
the dissertation.168 
3.2 Assumptions and limitations 
As doctrinal work, this dissertation is constrained by the general absence of direct 
empirical data. This is a clear limitation. However, I have made efforts to anchor 
the dissertation in second-hand data, where possible, to mitigate this. This is 
particularly present in the fourth article, which discusses incentives for competition 
compliance, which utilizes and refers to empirical work that has previously been 
undertaken by others in areas of behavioral economics, anthropology and 
psychology, in addition to legal research. This empirical-based material has greatly 
complemented the otherwise doctrinal approach. All in all, this eclectic approach 
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has enabled a more comprehensive and well-rounded analysis of the research 
questions at hand.169 
An element to be recognized in all research is the personal biases of the 
researcher. This is particularly important to acknowledge in doctrinal research, 
which operates without empirical data. While seeking to avoid it, I do have a 
personal bias of generally appreciating globalization and international cooperation. 
However, empirical research does show that globalization has been, by and large, 
significantly beneficial to both consumers and firms.170 Thus, the assumption that 
international cooperation in trade matters is inherently desirable is not likely false. 
In this light, it is worth underscoring that this dissertation does not, however, 
attempt to put forward claims about the desirability of globalization as such. 
The article on the extraterritorial application of competition law is based on the 
following assumptions. First, although each EU member state does have its own 
competition related policies and law, the article focuses on the views of the 
European Commission and the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in terms of 
European views, as the EU forms one common market outside of which 
extraterritorial application of its laws would occur. While the EU’s judicial position 
is not equal to that of a sovereign nation,171 this choice was made nonetheless. A 
study of EU competition law vis-à-vis its Member States would have required an 
entirely separate scholarly work. Second, while various restrictions of competition 
may differ significantly from one another, as such, the paradigm at hand affects 
multinational corporations (MNCs) equally regardless of such nature: mergers and 
acquisitions, other agreements between legal entities as well as conduct in a 
dominant position may all become problematic if subjected to extraterritorial 
competition law application. The divergent characteristics of each mostly affect the 
ways to attain clearance or potential sanctions, but not the existence of the issue 
itself. Thus, my analysis does not differentiate between restrictions, but rather stays 
on a more abstract level, which is justified in this regard. 
The article on export cartels assumes that an increase in international trade 
equally increases global welfare and while it does not explore that area as such, it 
nonetheless does recognize that such causation is an oversimplification. ‘Welfare’, 
as mentioned throughout this article, is meant to refer to the economic welfare of –
in other words the amount of prosperity – individuals. ‘Global welfare’, in turn, is 
meant to refer to the aggregated economic welfare of individuals without regard to 
frontiers between nation-states. Cartels that occur purely between nations, such as 
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the cartel between oil-producing nations (OPEC) are excluded and instead the 
focus is placed on the export cartel conduct of entities that are subject to domestic 
competition laws. The focus of this article is export cartels exclusively, meaning 
that domestic cartels are not. International cartels are addressed to the extent that 
their conduct affects markets other than their own domestic market. 
The guiding assumption of the article forecasting possible future paths for 
international cooperation in antitrust is that whatever actions major economic 
powers – the US, the EU, and China172 – decide to employ, they will significantly 
affect the kind of cooperation undertaken by other nations in the world in trade 
policy generally as well as in competition policy as a part of it. Collectively, said 
three regimes account for over 60 percent of the global economy and are all major 
economic powers.173 This is, in part, based on the argument that an overlapping 
consensus of major powers of a certain area could enable the possibility of deeper 
cooperation in such area.  
The fourth and final article provides an illustration of the key synthesis of the 
dissertation. It builds on the previous articles in the sense that it is focused on 
solutions, whereas the previous articles were more geared towards identifying 
issues and the limits to possible solutions. Answering its principal research 
question – how to better incentivize firms to comply with competition law – 
requires drawing from disciplines beyond legal studies. Research – a large 
proportion of which is empirical work – in the fields of psychology, sociology and 
behavioral economics, in particular, complement the otherwise largely doctrinal 
work. It intentionally disregards potential practical challenges associated with 
multilateral solutions generally, and also those associated with novel proposals. 
Instead, it attempts to help set a fresh course in the related contemporary discourse. 
3.3 Sources 
The sources are a mix of primary and secondary sources. The dissertation has an 
underscored emphasis on actions and inactions on a cross-border and international 
level. This results in national legislation and legal praxis-based sources being in a 
less significant role than perhaps is common in legal scholarship otherwise. 
Instead, the main primary sources consist of intergovernmental trade agreements 
and treaties, transgovernmental or supranational soft law recommendations and 
guidelines, and the more general norms and standards of international antitrust that 
one can deduct from them. An important source consists of political speeches and 
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other official press releases. The aforementioned list of sources is complemented 
by a broad base of relevant literature from Europe, the US, and beyond. The 
intention has been to keep with the general tradition of the field in question. 
Finding sources pertaining to China was particularly challenging given both the 
short existence of Chinese competition law and policy and further complicated by 
language barriers. This challenge was luckily partially mitigated by an interview 
with a Chinese competition law expert, who was also one of the persons involved 
in originally drafting China’s Anti-Monopoly Law. 
Empirical research is referred to at several instances. While the dissertation 
itself is not based on empirical work, the work previously done by economists and 
psychologists has been instrumental in helping to grasp both the magnitude of 
negative externalities that the incoherence of international antitrust produces and 
the impact of ways to reconcile them meaningfully. 
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4 Summary of Articles 
As a part of this dissertation, I have written a total of four articles that have each 
been separately published in peer-reviewed journals.  
The articles participate in and contribute to the current dialogue on 
international antitrust. They concurrently form a sequenced entity that begins with 
identifying and framing the issues that trouble international antitrust, moving on to 
proposing reasoned alternatives for improving the status quo. 
This chapter contains a summary of each of the articles, which is supplemented 
by additional reflection. Full length versions are presented at the end of this 
dissertation.  
4.1 What Extraterritorial Application of Competition 
Law Means for MNCs 
This article examines the legitimacy and breadth of extraterritorial application of 
competition law and considers its main implications for multinational corporations 
(MNCs).174 The focus is on the extraterritorial application of competition law in 
those situations where a specific action, event or occurrence neither takes place 
within the specific territory, nor is committed by nationals of the said territory.  
Several competition law regimes around the world, including the EU and the 
US, have enacted rules allowing their respective authorities to apply their own 
competition laws to activities occurring outside of their region’s borders, that is 
extraterritorially.175 MNCs are significant players in the global marketplace and are 
involved either directly or indirectly in a large share of the business being carried 
out in the world of today.176 As a result of the extraterritorial application of 
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competition law, MNCs face the challenge of concurrently adhering to the rules 
and regulations of even more jurisdictions than otherwise. 
There are a number of objectives for the extraterritorial application of 
competition law. First, reaching export cartels, which are generally not prohibited 
in the state where the export cartel takes place, unless it affects competition in the 
said state’s market.177 Second, preventing a competition policy ‘race to the bottom’, 
which translates into seeking the jurisdiction which least restricts a company’s 
operations or projects.178 Third, states with established traditions in competition 
legislation, such as the US and the EU are likely to prefer exporting their own 
competition laws and procedures in situations where multilateral options would 
require compromises.179 Finally, gaining better access to foreign markets is likely 
also a goal for the extraterritorial application of competition law, although market 
access is arguably not (or at least should not be) a goal of competition law.180 
Legitimacy may be drawn from a nation’s desire to protect the economic 
wellbeing of its citizens.181 In terms of legality, generally recognized international 
law often actually considers that such extraterritorialism is a part of the 
‘territoriality principle’ inasmuch as a certain act affects a certain territory.  
Enforcement, however, presents a practical problem. The assistance of another 
state is needed, since extraterritorial application of competition laws occurs, by 
definition, beyond the affected state’s borders.182 Sweeney argues that nations are 
likely to refuse requests for cooperation.183 Further, no relevant multilateral treaty 
exists to prevent refusal, which renders it quite arduous for officials to ensure 
efficient and consistent enforcement. Sweeney further suggests that the lack of 
information sharing is due to a lack of trust and that states may not be convinced 
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that the opportunity for information sharing is worth the downside of 
communicating confidential information of their citizens abroad.184 In any case, the 
current situation is far from predictable for MNCs. 
Despite these enforcement challenges, the EU and the US have applied their 
competition regime on an extraterritorial basis on multiple occasions.185 Many 
other nations have the possibility to do so as well, based on their current domestic 
competition legislation. Although most nations may not have taken advantage of 
the possibility, its mere existence places a great burden and a negative externality 
on multinational corporations and, albeit indirectly, on the global community. 
Extraterritorial application of competition law leads to the competition laws of 
multiple nations potentially being applicable concurrently, while their substance 
may be conflicting.186 It damages the coherence of jurisprudence by allowing 
competing legal doctrines to apply simultaneously within a single jurisdiction.  
The main implications for MNCs are twofold: increased competition 
compliance cost from divergent substantive regimes as well as an additional burden 
from multiple notification and other divergent administrative requirements. To 
consumers, these will inevitably translate into higher-than-necessary prices and less 
investment in new markets due to the related burden and uncertainty.187  
Nations understandably desire a comprehensive method that allows them to be 
able to ensure effective competition within their territory. However, from the 
perspective of a single business – which creates said competition in the first place – 
the current arrangement is far from optimal.  
This article presents a concrete problem that results from a sub-optimal state of 
international antitrust. The following article concerning export cartels continues by 
presenting a further, yet interlinked, problem, since a key justification for the 
existence of the extraterritorial application of competition law is in aiming to 
address foreign export cartels.  
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4.2 Export Cartels and the Case for Global Welfare  
Export cartels are a trade measure whose aim is to give exporters of a certain 
nation an advantage in world trade by – either explicitly or implicitly – exempting 
conduct to the extent that its effects do not harm domestic markets. This includes 
cooperation that otherwise might be prohibited as a hard-core cartel if the 
international dimension was omitted. There is thus a gap in international antitrust 
rules when it comes to export cartels – at least in principle. This article’s interest 
lies in the question of why this issue remains unresolved while the status quo is 
still clearly less than desirable in terms of global welfare.  
Originally, the intention of such export cooperation is said to have been to 
balance the detrimental effects of cartels then present on the buyer-side in the 
importing market, when competition enforcement in such an importing nation did 
not exist.188 Problems arise, however, when many nations begin to simultaneously 
enforce competition legislation and still maintain exemptions for export 
cooperation. Also, global welfare is not a zero-sum game; thus, improved 
conditions for one do not inevitably mean respectively worse conditions for the 
other. There are a number of known export cartels, originating in a number of 
nations. These include inter alia, the vitamin C cartel in China,189 the American 
soda ash cartel,190 Ghana’s cocoa bean cartel,191 and the potash cartel between 
companies of Canadian origin.192  
The impact of export cartels is a highly debated topic. It is still somewhat 
unresolved, partly owing to the dearth of reliable and comprehensive empirical 
data, which is largely due to most nations having chosen to implicitly allow export 
cartel activity, which requires no official registration and thus often operates 
undetected.193  
It appears that the harm of an export cartel largely depends on its market 
power.194 Jenny argues that cooperation in export cartels may well be partially 
procompetitive, but may also partially be conduct that would be classified as hard-
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core collusion in cases where the effects hit the domestic market instead of being 
directed elsewhere.195 It is not likely necessary to consider that such a combination 
of cooperation is inevitably and inherently essential, specifically in an export 
context. Rather, it would make sense to treat such combined cooperation as it 
would be treated if the effects were to occur in the domestic market.  
There are a few challenges in embracing a common solution concerning export 
cartels. First, a claim that the benefits of export cartels outweigh their possible 
negative effects and that they enable exporting entities to reach markets they would 
not be able to reach otherwise. This is likely most relevant in cases where the 
receiving nation’s markets do not have an adequate level of competition law and 
related enforcement and, as a result, local markets are distorted to the extent that 
importing entities are in need of something to help countervail such distortion, such 
as export cartels. However, it is not at all clear that such access requires cartel-like 
collusion to succeed, as discussed above.196   
Second is protectionism, which may manifest itself in a number of ways, from 
favoring so-called ‘national champions’ to resisting any international agreements 
that may reduce national sovereignty and other such conduct in the name of 
national welfare. This encompasses several separate, yet interrelated issues. The 
common denominator being that there may be situations in which a nation finds 
itself facing a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ where unilaterally altering its stance towards 
export cartels may not make sense – particularly if the nation is a net exporter with 
only a few key industries.197  
Third, monitoring and enforcing a multilateral rule on export cartels would be 
challenging, since it would inevitably transfer a part of a nation’s sovereignty and 
structuring such enforcement would be arduous. Finally, there is a general 
(dis)belief in a market economy model, which particularly historically has 
prevented further cooperation in this area. 
Export cartels may be used as a way to promote a nation’s important industries, 
in order to increase employment and to boost such a nation’s economy. In order to 
induce nations to support change, it is likely necessary to include some 
countervailing benefits.  
Proposed resolutions often include removing special treatment and instead 
advise to prohibit anticompetitive conduct of export cartels on equal grounds as 
would be done in cases of domestic cartels. Even total bans on export cartels have 
been proposed.198 Further, a number of trade-related resolutions have been 
 
 
195  Jenny (2012), p. 101. 
196  Supra at 195. 
197  Sweeney (2010), pp. 70–71. 
198  See Messerlin (1994), pp. 2–3.  
Summary of Articles 
 45 
proposed, some proposing a revamp of the WTO anti-dumping rules to apply to 
overcharges or utilizing innovative interpretations of the GATT to encourage states 
to act in the collective benefit. The author feels that perhaps the simplest and the 
most realistic way to achieve substantive progress would be to couple export cartel 
restrictions with compensatory payments or tariff reductions of some form, in order 
to incentivize net exporting nations to act in a manner that would otherwise conflict 
with their nation’s welfare.  
Cartel conduct should not be treated in varying ways based on where the 
effects occur. After all, procompetitive cooperation would likely continue to be 
viewed as such, while ‘hard-core’ restraints, whose object is restraining 
competition, could be better minimized than today. In the case of global welfare, 
assumptions regarding the adverse effects of cartel conduct are valid irrespective of 
where the effects happen to occur.  
It is noteworthy that certain types of cooperation between exporting entities 
may well possess procompetitive elements. Thus, a blanket ban on such 
cooperation would not be an improvement. Instead, a resolution would be to 
remove the special treatment that export cartels have thus far enjoyed. Only this 
would truly allow for more fair and consistent international competition policy, to 
the extent that the issue of export cartels is concerned. For the time being, however, 
reaching a comprehensive multilateral agreement seems beyond reach. This should 
not, however, be seen as the only available avenue towards progress.  
Export cartels and the extraterritorial application of competition law are 
longstanding problems for which a resolution still eludes the international 
community. Development requires conscious effort and any true global 
improvement needs the support of major economic powers.  
4.3 Convergence, divergence or disturbance – 
How major economic powers approach 
international antitrust 
This article attempts to understand how the driving forces of the global economy 
—the EU, the US, and China — view and approach international antitrust. This is 
done by analyzing their recent stances as well as longer trends in their actions and 
inactions in terms of international cooperation on competition issues. The guiding 
assumption being that whatever actions such major powers decide to employ, they 
will significantly affect the kind of cooperation undertaken by other nations in the 
world in trade policy generally, as well as in competition policy specifically.  
Arguably, the mentioned three major powers are not the only jurisdictions that 
impact international trade and competition policy. Nations such as Brazil, India, 
and Japan have economies that are enormous in size. Also, both Australia and 
Michael Ristaniemi 
 46 
Canada are nations which have significant relevance and impact internationally and 
whose competition regime is arguably more developed than China’s. The decision 
to focus on China in addition to the traditional dichotomy of the EU and the US is 
however justified. China is on an entire different level in terms of its potential to 
impact international trade policy and – I argue – that potential extends to 
competition policy, too, should China so desire. This potential to influence 
competition policy would not necessarily be so much based on its refinement 
emanating from a mature regime, but rather from its sheer economic power and 
dynamic.  
The goals of each of these three major powers are partly similar in relation to 
international cooperation and competition policy specifically: each of them has an 
interest in the health of their respective economy. There are differences, though. 
The US is the most explicit about its aim in securing the position of US 
corporations in foreign markets and has taken great proactive measures in 
furthering this goal, most recently concerning China. On the other hand, China, has 
traditionally been a follower in terms of international cooperation in competition 
policy.199 Despite being a major power, it has not attempted to engage 
internationally to the extent of the US. However, its emphasis too has been quite 
strongly on trade issues, particularly on facilitating export activity from China as 
well as encouraging foreign investment into China.200 The EU has the broadest 
approach – its political rhetoric seems to aim to benefit not only EU corporations, 
but Europeans by and large. The consumer welfare element seems more direct than 
in the rhetoric of the US or China.201 Also, the EU treats international cooperation 
in competition issues as a way of partly harnessing globalization in general. This 
taps into the broader scheme of the functioning of global markets that also involves 
positions on other related matters, such as subsidies, tax avoidance, and promoting 
innovation as a whole.202 
The major powers begin to differ more when looking at how they attempt to 
reach their goals. The US is by far the most aggressive. It has several times applied 
its antitrust laws extraterritorially when its markets have been impacted by foreign 
conduct – acts which risk sparking trade friction.203 Cooperation in enforcement is 
today not uncommon for the US enforcers, particularly with more mature 
competition law regimes, and it appears to be becoming even more frequent.204 The 
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EU is also active, but in a more cooperative sense – it is by far the most convinced 
about deepening international dialogue and cooperation, including both substantive 
and technical convergence, both bilaterally and multilaterally. China, on the other 
hand, tends to favor minimal international cooperation and acts more on a reactive 
than proactive basis. Each of the major powers has, however, generally increased 
its international cooperative efforts compared to previous decades, particularly at 
the operative level.205 
There are a few key reasons for the above-mentioned differences: First, each of 
the major powers has a markedly differing past experience with competition law 
and policy both domestically and internationally. While the American antitrust 
experience is characterized by a notion of uniqueness and global leadership, 
China’s experience has been that of a socialist closed economy, whose logic was 
not concerned about maximizing welfare through rigorous competition between 
firms.206 By contrast, the evolution of competition law in the EU has, in part, a 
strong utilitarian objective – aiding the creation of a functioning single market that 
transcends the borders of its Member States. Second is a sense of exceptionalism 
that is present in all three major powers, but in differing ways: China emphasizes 
its absolute sovereignty; the EU, in turn, emphasizes its social values combined 
with the market economy as well as its inclination for multilateral cooperation; and 
the US simply often views itself as the center of the antitrust universe, given its 
long tradition in the field.207 Finally, the major powers’ economic logic differs. The 
major powers have differing views on how to structure their respective national 
economies. A notable diverging point is the optimal level of state intervention, with 
the US and China at opposite ends of the spectrum, and the EU somewhere in 
between. 
Despite the above, the major powers do have an interest in cooperating 
internationally in competition issues. The EU and the US appear to desire further 
convergence of practices and substantive thinking. Officially, China does not 
appear to have a strong stance on convergence, but recent practice shows that it too 
has engaged in an increasing amount of dialogue on competition matters. Indeed, 
there is an increasing amount of cooperation in relation to investigating 
international cartels, referring to cartels that operate in several nations concurrently 
and which seek to cartelize them.208 
Further, the competition authorities of major powers have an incentive to 
ensure that merger control procedures affecting mergers benefiting their respective 
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regions are as internationally streamlined and coordinated as possible given the 
number of multinationals that originate from each of their respective territories. 
Nonetheless, there are a few hurdles for streamlining international merger control. 
First is the dichotomous leadership of the US and the EU systems, with no single 
leading standard to become the global standard. Second, there are clear differences 
in nations’ scope of merger review that may arise from partially differing sets of 
goals should they attempt to address public interest or other non-competition 
related concerns concurrently with competition concerns.209 In any case, the 
aggregate cost of a fragmented system of international merger control is arguably 
higher than it would need to be. Improved, more structured coordination could 
help, as discussed further in Chapters 5 and 6 below. 
Perhaps the greatest substantive difference is in terms of the treatment of 
unilateral conduct. This divide has been researched at length and is due to deeply 
rooted differences in philosophy, institutional arrangements, and procedure.210 
Unilateral conduct has also been a particularly topical theme in recent years, given 
the significance of the digital economy generally and the related characteristics of 
big data and network effects that are conducive to concentration. The EU has taken 
a much more interventionist approach than the American, or Chinese agencies have 
towards unilateral conduct of key digital platform firms, such as Amazon, Google, 
and WeChat, and is the only regime of the three to have found serious violations.211 
It appears that there is no simple resolution in sight concerning unilateral conduct. 
It is considerably easier to formalize cooperation in procedural aspects than 
substantive analysis, as it is a matter of streamlining administrative process instead 
of finding a consensus on the substantive criteria by which mergers are reviewed. 
Synchronizing and streamlining procedure is in the mutual interest of all involved, 
whereas cooperation on substantive review might well involve undesirable 
compromises. Coordinating timing and remedies is an ever-increasing part of inter-
agency case cooperation. There is a demand for this, in trying to avoid unnecessary 
burden on businesses,212 and there does not appear to be any true opposing force 
within the major powers.  
Discussing state-imposed restraints on competition is also relevant, since 
reducing these is on the agenda of international competition issues for all three 
major powers. The US and the EU are both concerned about discriminatory 
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treatment abroad, albeit their precise emphasis is different, as discussed above.213 
China, too, is interested in ensuring market access for its companies in foreign 
markets and is a proponent of free trade and open markets in its political 
rhetoric.214 The EU appears to be the most interested of the major powers, if not the 
only one, in a more stringent system of less subsidies than the WTO rules allow.215 
This is logical, since it has sophisticated state aid rules that serve an important 
internal role in ensuring the functioning of the EU’s internal market, which aim at 
“leveling the playing field”.216 Nevertheless, by-and-large, it seems that the WTO 
subsidies rules will continue to be the primary framework for subsidies in the 
foreseeable future.217 
The major powers all appear to acknowledge that there is a need for mutual 
understanding, coordination and cooperation in competition matters in order to 
facilitate international trade. However, they seem to lack the appetite for 
transformative or otherwise grand developments in international antitrust. They 
seem rather content in primarily deepening their relationships with key trading 
partners instead of investing time and effort multilaterally. The difference in 
maturity between more developed regimes and their newer counterparts is, 
however, still enormous, which sets a limit on the possible forms of cooperation.218  
Deeper cooperation in procedural and technical areas, consisting of measures 
that allow nations to reinforce their possibilities to act extraterritorially and 
increase agency efficiency does show potential. Such measures could include better 
information sharing and coordination in investigations as well as technical 
assistance.219 Most – if not all – of which cooperation would likely be on a non-
binding, voluntary basis. 
The article’s findings allow consideration of how to improve coordination and 
the structure of cooperation internationally. Further structure in voluntary 
cooperation – inter alia in streamlining procedural matters – could bring added 
clarity and consistency. A perhaps overlooked actor in antitrust governance and 
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enforcement is the firm and the potential for both added convergence and support 
in enforcement that multinational firms could contribute.  
4.4 The Public Role of Private Firms in 
Competition Enforcement and How to 
Incentivise It 
This article argues that the current approach towards antitrust enforcement is too 
narrow and, as a result, competition deterrence is not as efficient and effective as 
could be. In proposing an improvement, this article takes a broader view on the 
ways to improve how both the letter and the spirit of competition law is followed. 
Its focus is the main actor in competition law – the firm – and particularly on how 
to better induce firms to compete and, at the minimum, avoid anticompetitive 
conduct. Firms should be seen not only as potential infringers, but also as valuable 
partners in ensuring competitive markets. 
A broader approach encouraging compliance could improve the patchy 
existence of international antitrust – one consisting of several gaps and overlaps. 
This is – in part – due to diverging competition law enforcement among NCAs. 
Most nations have competition laws on paper, but enforcement is often inconsistent 
or otherwise lacking. These enforcement gaps exacerbate the inconsistency of 
international antitrust and may result from a number of reasons, including a lack of 
resources, experience or formal jurisdiction. An improved impetus for firms to 
maintain robust compliance programs, self-police and to be transparent about their 
actions could help make up for part of the deficit. 
The simplest policy approach favors the negative incentive220 of financial or 
criminal sanction for undesired – that is illegal – conduct. Depending on the 
situation, these can be either substituted by or supplemented with positive 
incentives – rewards that encourage the conduct that is desired by policymakers. 
These might be actually paid out – such as in many subsidies – or alternatively they 
may be reduced from a sum owed by the firm, inter alia in relation to taxes or 
fines. Finally, there are hybrid (also known as ‘carrot with stick’) incentives, such 
as reporting obligations. In the case of reporting obligations specifically, they are 
typically either on a ‘comply-or-explain’ basis – meaning that the firm explains if it 
deviates from the prescribed obligations – or on a ‘comply-and-explain’221 basis, 
requiring a public explanation of the ways in which compliance is reached in 
addition to compliance itself.  
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Policymakers have a wealth of tools to impact a firm’s conduct using 
incentives. The most varied examples of policymakers creatively using incentives 
to induce compliance can be seen in the realm of ESG issues. The following lists a 
few of them: 
– Rewarding desired conduct, including subsidizing, granting tax reliefs, 
and fine reductions.222 
– Increasing transparency through increased reporting obligations.223 
– Emphasizing sustainability in government investing and procurement.224  
While, inter alia, former Commissioner Almunía has emphasized the importance 
of fostering a culture of competition compliance,225 there has been surprisingly 
limited focus by NCAs and policymakers on how positive incentives could be used 
in the context of fulfilling the goals of competition policy. A notable exception is 
the near-universal protection of intellectual property – a clear reward for 
prospective authors and inventors in exchange for their efforts.  
The question then becomes, what can and should be done to improve the 
current state of affairs. First, raising general awareness in society about 
anticompetitive conduct and its detrimental effects helps – in particular by 
strengthening moral condemnation towards competition law violators.226 Second, 
society should place more emphasis on a firm’s attempts (or lack thereof) to 
prevent such misconduct.227 The latter becomes even more relevant considering the 
shift in general public governance towards so-called co-governance or interactive 
governance where other actors in society are given a more pronounced role, as 
opposed to more hierarchical, state-driven governance, as referred to within 
governance theory.228 The article continues by presenting and discussing two 
distinct examples of how positive incentives could be employed in order to 
improve competition law compliance. 
First, it discusses the potential associated with rewarding firms for maintaining 
genuine compliance programs. This approach would mark a shift in emphasis from 
ex post detection of already-occurred incidents to a system which values firms’ ex 
ante prevention efforts. Effective compliance programs alleviate some of the 
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burden of competition authorities and help extend the reach of enforcement. From 
a firm’s perspective, such a reward works as an insurance policy – it will help you, 
should you need it. Such an approach would also constitute a shift away from a 
strict liability system towards a more duty-based system relying on negligence in 
the context of competition infringements.229 However, this should not replace the 
current approach but rather supplement it, since mixed (also known as composite) 
liability regimes have been shown to generally be more efficient than systems 
composed of only either of the two.230 Also, importantly, rewarding compliance 
programs as fine reductions would not necessarily be as costly for society as 
traditional positive incentives, since the payout would only occur in conjunction 
with infringement cases, the number of which is limited.231  
Challenges do exist. It is difficult to define what an effective or diligent 
compliance program should consist of.232 It is equally difficult for judges to 
objectively ascertain whether a compliance program has been effective – especially 
since they will be doing so in cases of infringement. Also, it is argued that 
requirements for certain types of compliance programs may impose an undue 
burden on small and medium sized firms, whose resources are inevitably limited.233 
Finally, there is the principle of rewarding malicious conduct that some 
policymakers struggle with conceding.234 However, it is difficult to assign much 
weight to the strength of such a principle in jurisdictions that have adopted 
leniency regimes. These may, after all, relieve the whistleblower entirely of fines. 
Further, rewards should not be seen narrowly as to benefit wrongdoers, but as a 
potential cost of maintaining a system that may generate – possibly substantial – 
increases in prevention and deterrence. 
Second, the paper discusses the implications if firms were to be required to 
report compliance efforts, a form of a form of government ‘nudging’ – that is, 
aiming at steering firms in desired ways.235 Its purpose is to empower the firm’s 
shareholders and general public to be able to influence the firm’s efforts (or 
absence thereof) through dialogue, but which concurrently has the potential of 
improving a firm’s reputation and governance practices.236 Pressure put on firms to 
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report so-called non-financial metrics, such as sustainability and human rights 
issues, is increasing year after year. Recognizing that competition compliance does 
not exist in isolation from other compliance efforts within a firm, extending 
reporting obligations to competition issues would be an opportunity to help 
improve competition compliance.  
Interestingly, firms de facto often seem to comply with guidelines, standards 
and procedures, even if they are on a comply-or-explain basis and in fact, de jure 
voluntary.237 Such adoption may lead to increased credibility externally and better 
comparability with peers. Added transparency could be particularly useful in 
situations where authorities’ resources are constrained, since the public and NGOs 
would be empowered by having more information about firms. I would contend 
that this would be of particular use in jurisdictions where competition enforcement 
faces the most constraints, such as in most developing countries and other regimes 
with younger competition authorities.  
Developing competition compliance incentives presents significant 
opportunities for improving the state and consistency of international antitrust, 
while leaving national sovereignty – the usual sticking point in deepening 
international antitrust cooperation – untouched. Structurally, a transgovernmental 
opt-in voluntary framework could be viable – particularly considering the recent 
positive experiences within the ICN.238 As long as anticompetitive conduct 
continues to occur, all tools that can improve the functioning of competitive 
markets are worth considering. A shift towards an ‘enabling environment’ in 
competition policy – appreciating the partnership role of firms – could be useful, 
and added focus towards incentivizing preventive measures has merit as a tool in 
doing so. 
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5 The Regime Complex of 
International Antitrust and Its 
Potential 
5.1 Trends in global law and governance 
To obtain a fuller image of the as-is state of international antitrust, it is worth 
discussing what is termed ‘global law’ and its current state. Traditional 
international law has relied on two core pillars: intergovernmental cooperation and 
supranational organizations, both organized via binding treaties. Today, in terms of 
treaties, bilateralism reigns supreme. This has created the so-called spaghetti bowl 
effect, coined for the status quo’s complexity.239  
The existing multilateral treaties by which international organizations have 
been formed face severe challenges, too. This is due, in particular, to inherent 
horizontal and vertical conflicts. The former concerns the distributional issues that 
may cause friction between nations, while the latter concerns the agent-principal 
relationship of international organizations and the nations that have founded 
them.240 These conflicts intersect and are inherently challenging to fully 
reconcile.241 Further, the world order is becoming markedly more polycentric than 
it was when most of the world’s key international organizations were created. The 
internal power balance may thus not reflect the reality of today, unless the relevant 
organizations are able to renew themselves. Indeed, there have been calls for 
organizations, such as the WTO and the UN, to reform.242 
Global law spans beyond traditionally conceptualized international law. Husa 
argues that legal globalization refers to law of non-state governance systems, ie. 
those norms whose development is beyond the purview of any given state.243 
Recently, there has been great interest in attempting to conceptualize a kind of 
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global governance, which is sometimes called ‘global administrative law’. It 
attempts to encompass principles akin to those of domestic administrative law – 
concerning due process, transparency, etc.  
In analyzing this developing field, Kingsbury argues that global administrative 
law does not fulfill all criteria of the concept of law, as it ‘lacks political and 
institutional support at global level’.244 Instead, it is interconnected with 
specialized regimes operating internationally. In such a case, pluralism should not 
be defined as a set of conflicting norms, but instead as a ‘multiplicity of diverse 
communicative processes in a given social field’.245 Such a situation concerns law, 
but certain actions are concurrently hard to categorize under the binary dichotomy 
of legality and illegality.246  
The above characterization is likely true for the broader concept of global law, 
as well as for international antitrust. Indeed, the concept of global law appears to 
include redefining basic legal categories.247  
Pollack and Shaffer have identified three models in which such international 
governance takes place: intergovernmental, transgovernmental, and 
transnational.248 Intergovernmental cooperation is a manifestation of traditional 
diplomacy – interaction between the official positions of nations. 
Transgovernmental cooperation, in contrast, takes place between non-elected 
bureaucrats – often in voluntary networks-based settings, such as the ICN and the 
OECD. While mostly technocratic, such cooperation does often de facto play a 
material role in shaping international norms and standards. Lastly, transnational 
governance refers to interaction which welcomes the participation of a broader 
base of stakeholders, such as firms and non-governmental organizations. Ideas of 
global administrative law might arguably help improve the legitimacy of 
international fora from the viewpoint of their stakeholders.249 
From this conceptualization, one can deduce a drastic shift in international 
cooperation from intergovernmentalism towards transgovernmentalism – that is, 
one that emphasizes international voluntary networks over binding treaties. Within 
international antitrust, this is exemplified by the failure of the WTO in its attempt 
to codify international norms of antitrust, while voluntary networks, such as the 
ICN and the OECD, have been far more successful in their approach. Slaughter 
argues that such transgovernmental networks have proliferated greatly in the past 
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few decades, not only within international antitrust, but indeed much more 
broadly.250 Such networks can be described as international institutions linking 
various governmental actors, whose informal and voluntary way of working has 
been a distinct departure from traditional intergovernmental diplomacy. Although 
sometimes orchestrated251 by ‘legitimate’ actors such as states or international 
organizations, such networks have been criticized as lacking in democracy, as they 
are frequently devoid of political oversight, usually consisting of unelected 
officials, as well as – at times – of proper transparency.252 In any case, the influence 
and subsequent importance of transgovernmental arrangements is noticeable.  
Another trend concerns the rise specialized rules and rule-systems. The 
proliferation of transgovernmentalism has had repercussions on the pluralism of 
international law by further solidifying it. While pluralism has earlier arguably 
been more about the pluralism of state positions, now it is more pronounced in 
those of substance-related regimes.253 This can be seen as a diffusion of power – 
the participants of such regimes often tend to be unelected government officials, 
private sector firms, or non-governmental organizations. At the same time, the 
involved persons tend to be highly specialized experts. For instance, as 
Koskenniemi argues, very few experts likely consider themselves part of the public 
law tradition oriented towards an idea of global federalism.254 
A third trend is that of increased polycentricity. Recent years have seen the 
relative decrease of US hegemony and the almost simultaneous rise of China, while 
the EU – as the world’s largest economic area – has also managed to wield its 
influence to significantly influence the formation of global norms and standards.255 
The list does not end there, but rather regional powers, such as India, the Russian 
Federation, and Brazil appear to be increasing their relative power.256 The key point 
being that the number of rule-makers in the global space is on the rise. This can 
also be seen in the antitrust space with China’s growing economic power and more 
mature competition regimes in – inter alia – Brazil and Canada. 
A key concept is that of regime complexity, a term first coined by Raustiala 
and Victor257 and which refers to ‘international political systems of global 
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governance that emerge because of the co-existence of rule density and regime 
complexes’.258 Regime complexes are partially overlapping and non-hierarchical 
institutions that include a number of international agreements and authorities.259 A 
key element to them is a degree of rivalry through conflicting assertions of 
authority within a given regime.260 Further dissecting the concept, a regime in an 
international context can be referred to as a set of rules and norms governing a 
particular issue area.261 As argued above, international law is increasingly 
fragmented into the pluralist reality of highly specialized regimes and their sets of 
rules. This is highly relevant for synthesizing international antitrust, as will be 
argued below in this chapter. 
5.2 Limits of global law and governance 
International law is arguably often based on an assumption that nations will honor 
their obligations based on concepts of opinio juris and pacta sunt servanda. 262 
Goldsmith and Posner are however skeptical of this and instead present four 
categories – or situations – in which nations will be inclined to cooperate with 
others. First, in cases where nations’ interests happen to coincide, cooperation is 
natural and mutually beneficial.263 Second, there are situations of coordination – 
where nations receive higher payoffs by engaging in symmetrical actions than in 
absence of such coordination.264 Third, cooperation takes place where nations see 
larger medium to long term benefits for themselves even if acting otherwise would 
be in their self-interest in the short term.265 Fourth, in situations where a nation 
holds significant influence over another state, coercion might be the chosen method 
of interaction.266 That is, Goldsmith and Posner argue that nations do not act based 
on a sense of obligation, but rather by furthering their self-interest in one or several 
of the presented methods. 
A case in point is the WTO. It is an organization that aims at opening trade, 
facilitating intergovernmental trade negotiation, and resolving related disputes. 
Freer trade has arguably been beneficial, but more so for some nations than for 
others. The WTO divides nations into Developing, Developed, and Less-
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Developed – a categorization which affects their treatment concerning inter alia 
tariffs and subsidies.267 WTO rules were originally shaped for industrial economies 
with strong domestic markets and advanced firms, such as the US and the EU.268 
These economies have been able to exert pressure on others to join a system that 
might actually be suboptimal for such other nations. Recent years have, however, 
seen nations with growing influence – China in particular – breaking WTO rules to 
their liking, while new negotiations within the WTO are stagnating – the Doha 
Round has been ongoing since 2001. In these almost twenty years, nations have 
instead concluded a vast amount of bilateral trade agreements, given the enduring 
need for coordination.269 This questioning of a commonly agreed framework can be 
seen as a manifestation of increasing polycentricity and the resulting diffusion of 
power.  
When it comes to international law – it arguably presumes the absence of 
normative conflict and existing normative conflict is inherently a matter of 
diplomacy concerning how it is resolved or mitigated.270 The fact is that pluralism 
is omnipresent – both within national jurisdictions and between them. Given that 
global governance has shifted from political intergovernmental ways towards those 
more driven by technical experts through transgovernmentalism, relying on 
diplomacy is not a catch-all. Instead, international law needs to be responsive to 
inevitable norm collision.271 Koskenniemi argues that the true question is not 
whether a kind of global constitutionalism or pluralism is desirable, but more about 
the idea that international law should regain its political dimension and not be 
relegated to mere functional governance.272 This is about accountability, or the lack 
thereof – an ailment in much of the international cooperation of today and one to 
which ideas of global administrative law are another response.  
The above, including the question of a preference for either political or 
apolitical international cooperation, is interesting for international antitrust as well. 
The political dimension has historically been problematic, while functional, 
operative level cooperation on a voluntary basis has been promoted as the primary 
mode for cooperating, especially since the WTO negotiations broke down. It is 
however worthy of consideration whether the reasoning and merit underlying this 
approach is still valid and whether there is instead an opening to re-engage at the 
political level.  
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5.3 Where antitrust fits in 
Let us put the above further into the context of international antitrust, especially 
since one can see several analogies. First, the success of organizations such as the 
ICN, the OECD, and UNCTAD largely represents the rise of transgovernmental 
networks, in line with Slaughter’s argumentation,273 but it also illustrates the rise of 
technical experts and specialist regimes as key drivers of international law, as 
described by Koskenniemi and Leino above.274 At the same time, no multilateral, 
treaty-based ‘constitutional’ initiatives for antitrust issues have been made or 
advanced for almost two decades.  
Second, polycentricity is on the rise. This is by virtue of China’s economic 
power but also the relative maturity of non-EU-US competition jurisdictions, such 
as Canada, Brazil, and Australia. Polycentricity poses a novel challenge within 
international antitrust, since the models of cooperation have been created with the 
US and the EU in key positions, which risks creating tension when other nations 
gain in influence. This situation is not unique. Examples of such tension can be 
seen in other areas of international cooperation, such as the current ‘Bretton 
Woods’ international monetary order, which is under threat particularly by China-
led competing initiatives.275 All in all, it is clear that the predominant form of 
cooperation has shifted.  
International antitrust can be seen as a regime complex. As described above in 
the preceding subsection, a regime complex is a form of incoherent and non-
hierarchical system that consists of multiple arrangements and authorities, several 
of which assert authority. In the context of international antitrust, one can see the 
relevant pieces of the puzzle – domestic enforcers and courts claim jurisdiction 
extraterritorially, thus creating rivalries. Organizations, such as the OECD, the 
ICN, UNCTAD, and the ICC are all transgovernmental networks working towards 
creating norms and standards but are in no hierarchical relation with each other. 
Also, there is a surprisingly large number of preferential trade agreements that 
contain chapters on competition – also concerning trade agreements in which 
neither North America or Europe are a part, at times referred to as south-to-south 
trade agreements.276 This finding is not without meaning, as it allows international 
antitrust to become more connected to the general theoretical ideas of analogous 
regimes. Regime complexes are challenging due to dubious accountability and 
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their instability, but they have also been argued to be flexible and encourage 
normative experimentation.277  
In search of a viable path for international antitrust, one could turn to a 
development in public policy – that is, emphasizing shared governance. This refers 
to a model whereby either the legislator or the enforcer – or even both – allow non-
state actors a more pronounced role, as opposed to more hierarchical, state-driven 
governance.278 This helps extend both the capacity and influence of state actors and 
their policy objectives, increasing their efficiency. Given the limitations of 
competition agencies of even the most mature jurisdictions, cooperation and 
partnerships driven by true incentives in the spirit of shared governance might 
show potential.  
In concrete terms, a potential way forward could be that of further structured 
transgovermentalism. Networks between competition agencies, particularly the 
ICN, arguably have substantial buy-in given their vast member base and its active 
participation. Government networks facilitate understanding and trust but also fulfil 
necessary coordination needs in a globalized world – in the absence of a ‘better’ 
option. This kind of cooperation works as a voluntary discussion forum to improve 
mutual understanding, but it also presents the potential to coordinate matters where 
a high level of consensus exists. The opt-in Frameworks the ICN has launched in 
recent years are examples of such a structure and seem to have support from both 
competition agencies and other stakeholders alike.  
Concerning non-state actors, a key point is how to better include them in ways 
that are actually useful. The current organizations in international antitrust are 
mainly geared towards government officials, albeit some allow other competition 
experts to participate.279 Their efficacy could arguably be improved, should firms 
and NGOs be better embraced. The UN Global Compact has arguably been a major 
success in the realm of corporate responsibility in meaningfully engaging firms, as 
mentioned in Section 2.4. Building on both mentioned successes, perhaps an opt-in 
network for firms – similar to the Global Compact – could be helpful within 
international antitrust. Such shared governance could help ease tensions between 
trade policy and competition policy. 
In any case, in order to function, advancing international antitrust cooperation 
should focus on bringing maximum coordination benefits with minimal intrusion 
into a nation’s domestic affairs. As discussed in Section 4.4 and in the underlying 
article, further harnessing MNCs to take on the societal role they have in 
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preventing anticompetitive conduct could consequentially ease the capacity 
restraints of competition enforcers and – also – arguably bridge gaps between 
jurisdictions of varying antitrust maturity.  
Structured cooperation, such as opt-in frameworks could be feasible, although 
binding commitments are likely to be difficult to agree on multilaterally. Such an 
approach could be particularly effective if combined with reporting obligations as 
is with the Global Compact – firms who have signed up must report annually on 
their efforts to comply in order to remain a member of the framework. Such 
comply-and-explain mechanisms are arguably effective, even if on a voluntary 
basis.280 Structured cooperation should focus on where sufficient common ground 
can be found, such as in procedural matters and concerning hard-core cartels. 
Other, more suitable fora exist for discussing points of divergence, such as how to 
treat firms in strong market positions, or how to address state aid and other 
industrial policy questions.  
It is important for international antitrust to remain responsive. In the pluralist 
and polycentric environment that it is, norm collision will continue to occur. As 
such, fixed and binding constitutionalism is neither possible nor desirable, but 
rather ways should be found which preemptively coordinate the conduct of actors – 
competition agencies, policymakers, and firms alike – to avoid unnecessary 
conflict and to develop tools in which to reconcile and manage the remaining 
inevitable norm collision.281  
The topic of international antitrust should be elevated on national political 
agendas.282 Choices about its development should be made – a common vision 
about its future should be pursued. The aim of the US and the EU towards 
convergence has been successful in building trust and in spreading ‘best practices’. 
However, the altered state of affairs as described in Section 2.3 calls for a revised 
aim, particularly on the part of major economic powers. 
Alternatives to the above proposal should be analyzed against Goldsmith and 
Posner’s four C’s underlying and justifying international cooperation – 
coincidence, coordination, cooperation, and coercion – as described in Section 5.2. 
Nations will, arguably, generally act as best suits their own self-interest. This does 
not, in itself, restrict modes of cooperation, as long as nations consider their long-
term interest. Current cooperation in international antitrust aims at coordination – 
that is, where participating nations directly receive higher payoffs by virtue of 
symmetrical cooperation, such as in TAs, but it is also partly coincidental. The key 
for improvement would be to shift the aim towards cooperation, as defined by 
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Goldsmith and Posner.283 Committing to such an approach bases conduct on 
maximizing long-term payoffs even if acting otherwise would be beneficial in the 
short term – an approach which is essential for deeper cooperation and the 
functioning of current instruments too, such as positive comity.  
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6 Conclusions of the Dissertation 
6.1 General conclusions 
Competition law is a complex field. It is arguably best suited to foster competition 
in a somewhat closed system and to address disruptions to and within said system. 
The cross-border realities of business however present material challenges to such 
a model. Trade does not stop at national frontiers, something that the growing 
influence of digitalization underscores. This will likely only continue, given the 
technological promises of Industry 4.0.284 As mentioned in Section 2.1 generally, 
this status quo, too, calls for both the political process to steer norm and standard 
creation in this space and for law to have a management role therein.  
International antitrust exists, but it is a very fragmented existence. A unified 
supranational code would surely help address this. However, achieving such deep 
harmonization is not realistic and perhaps not even desirable. National differences 
and the resulting differing needs for economic regulation should be acknowledged 
and – even if left unacknowledged – it should be accepted that a single standard 
will not likely be appropriate for all nations concerned.285 As alluded to in Chapter 
5 above, polycentricity and pluralism are not necessarily undesirable and – 
irrespectively – appear to be unavoidable in international antitrust. What is key is 
understanding how to reconcile conflicts and gaps within such a regime complex.  
Literature about international antitrust does not, by and large, take two major 
changed circumstances into consideration. First, most of the world’s nations now 
do have some sort of competition legislation. This is a sign of a general consensus 
on supporting a market-based economic model and, thus, most of said legislation 
does largely exhibit parallels toward many of what are normally considered to 
represent the most serious distortions to competition.286 The absence of competition 
law is no longer the problem it once was. Instead, regulatory overlaps and 
disparities in enforcement practices seem to be the major issues today. This calls 
for upgrading coordination. Second, the geopolitical power balance has shifted 
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during the past decades. With BRIC countries’287 economies on the rise, their 
negotiating power in international economic questions – including competition 
related ones –has also arguably increased and the former power duo – the US and 
the EU – ought to accept that there are more informed and influential views on 
antitrust than before. 
Politically, a noteworthy point of contention is the boundaries of competition 
law and whether it should regulate and protect so-called ‘public interest’ goals. 
These range from China’s ‘industrial policy’ that aims at favoring domestic firms 
to the EU’s heightened focus on discouraging vertical restraints, in order to 
safeguard its internal market project – not to mention sustainability and privacy 
concerns. Such priorities are unlikely to vanish and it is thus dubious what benefit 
or true coherence unified rules could even bring, particularly in the light of nations’ 
varying, but generally justified, interests and their unwillingness to relinquish their 
sovereignty – as described in previous sections of this dissertation.  
The key is mutual understanding. Instead of trying to do away with differing 
policy outcomes or procedural differences, Smits rightly argues that “…emphasis 
should be on exposing the various arguments for and against particular solutions, 
and on exposing how these arguments work in different jurisdictions. Competition 
between arguments leads to progress because one can learn from experiences 
elsewhere.”288 The ICN has been a particularly useful forum for fostering this kind 
of understanding. 
Cooperation in competition matters ties in with the trends and realities of 
international cooperation more broadly, including fluctuations in political climates. 
This can be seen particularly clearly in whether multilateral approaches are 
practically even viable or whether nations prefer bilateral agreements or looser 
networks-based cooperation. While the format of cooperation may vary, this does 
not reduce the importance of the substance of antitrust cooperation – ensuring that 
markets function, irrespective of where one’s national frontiers lie. In terms of the 
structure of international antitrust, voluntary cooperation has had an established 
role since the turn of the century, which it continues to have. Most formal 
international cooperation in competition law and policy has thus far been and still 
is conducted via bilateral and regional trade agreements (TAs), as well as more 
informally at operative, transgovernmental levels, such as within the ICN.  
Perhaps surprisingly, nearly half of the TAs recently signed or ratified globally 
do contain provisions on competition policy. They typically contain assurances that 
each signatory will prohibit restrictive business practices, such as cartels, abuses of 
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dominant positions et cetera, as well as assurances to enforce such prohibitions 
adequately. The common denominator being that said cooperation is mostly of a de 
facto non-binding nature only.289 This has likely facilitated such widespread 
appearance of these provisions in TAs. The absence of sanctions for non-
compliance means that nations are more easily able to accommodate wishes for 
such chapters, while emphasis may instead be placed elsewhere in TA negotiations.  
International antitrust cooperation needs a firmer structure. Soft law may be 
helpful to an extent, inter alia in streamlining investigations regarding potential 
infringements, or in mergers requiring review by several nations running in 
parallel. However, non-binding international cooperation has not been able to 
induce nations to institute more transformative improvements, such as restricting 
the conduct of export cartels. What is needed in addition to mere soft law, are 
frameworks that bind nations to action. To the extent that chapters on competition 
policy are included in TAs, it should be considered whether it would be beneficial 
for them to be made binding on the contracting parties, with appropriate dispute 
resolution mechanisms included.  
Enforcement appears to be a more problematic area than the consistency of 
substantive competition law, and ways to improve this are worthy of consideration. 
First, in practice only a handful of national competition authorities have sufficient 
experience and capacity to effectively enforce compliance with their respective 
competition laws. Disparities in enforcement practices are, however, likely to 
become less radical as competition authorities mature. Second, the structure of how 
national competition authorities operate as a collective is ill-suited to the demands 
of the ever-increasing cross-border nature of business. This is exacerbated by the 
challenges presented by the dynamic nature of the digital economy.290 New ways 
should be considered concerning how to multilaterally support enforcement in 
order to bridge the current disparity between agencies.  
Embracing ideas of shared governance in competition enforcement and thereby 
incentivizing firms towards more rigorous compliance efforts has the potential to 
help extend a competition agency’s reach and influence, as well as mitigate the 
mentioned coordination problems. This could concern both encouraging soft 
enforcement efforts in competition law by firms, as well as including firms in 
discussions over norms and standards in international antitrust, as with the ICN 
currently, but in more impactful ways. As mentioned in Section 2.3, antitrust 
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agencies are exploring digital tools to improve enforcement.291 If successful, such 
tools could also be considered as a part of international cooperation. 
The world is becoming more polycentric than it has been for a long time. As 
the hegemony of the United States wanes, so does the relevance of the international 
institutions it has created. Indeed, the UN and the WTO are examples of 
institutions grappling for survival. While both serve arguably valid purposes, they 
face inevitable need for reform in order to remain current in this updated world 
order. This puts further emphasis on other ways in which to conduct international 
cooperation and coordination, such as reinforcing the work taking place within 
transgovernmental networks.  
International antitrust could develop its voluntary approach towards more 
structured cooperation given the increase in competition policy maturity globally 
over the past few decades. This could be done inter alia by increasing the use of 
opt-in frameworks instead of ad hoc cooperation. There is particular potential 
concerning procedural questions in this regard but also concerning how to better 
harness firms to contribute towards soft enforcement. All in all, cooperation and 
relationships are worth developing.292  
In search of development paths, it is also useful to also look beyond 
competition law and into approaches employed in other areas of law and policy 
that operate in a similarly international environment. Areas such as environmental 
law and human rights norms are particularly worthy, since, first, our planet’s 
environment is one we share irrespective of nation-state nationality and, second – if 
not otherwise, human rights questions often tie into global value chains, whose 
effects span several jurisdictions. While no silver bullet, they might have the 
potential to inspire initiatives within international antitrust. As described in Chapter 
2, frameworks such as the UN based Paris Accord concerning the climate, and the 
Global Compact on corporate responsibility both operate on an opt-in basis without 
formal enforcement mechanisms. The commitment to this kind of activity can be 
seen as lying somewhere between being fully voluntary and fully binding – 
normative without formally being enforceable. There is no inherent reason why 
international antitrust should be any different. 
6.2 Key contributions of this dissertation 
The dissertation makes three particular contributions towards international 
antitrust: it uncovers potential in co-governance via networks and incentives; it 
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brings to light the changed reality and regime complexity of international antitrust 
and updates the related discourse accordingly; and it shows how major economic 
powers arguably guide the shape and form of future cooperation. 
First, it proposes a novel approach to improving international antitrust – one 
that emphasizes the societal role of firms and employing shared governance to 
antitrust enforcement. All tools should be considered in ensuring functioning 
markets, including the complementary power of soft enforcement and positive 
incentives. In this context, positive incentives are not rewarding anticompetitive 
conduct, but rather a cost of such a preventive system, a cost that is likely 
manageable.  
The argument in support of positive incentives is elaborated on both by 
providing examples of possible practical avenues to consider and by alluding to a 
broader framework that is worth bearing in mind when measures for improving 
deterrence are considered. Antitrust deterrence and related enforcement is arguably 
most effective as composite systems – those including both positive and negative 
incentives. Currently, however, positive incentives are not utilized nearly to their 
potential. Policymakers and competition authorities should better employ firms – 
the subjects of competition law – as their partners in ensuring functioning markets. 
Encouraging better self-enforcement by firms is an avenue that has thus far been 
somewhat overlooked and undervalued. Further, it would effectively extend the 
formal capacity of the relevant enforcement agency, since firms would put more 
effort into self-enforcement. The result being less anticompetitive conduct to detect 
and better functioning markets.  
Harnessing firms to self-police would align with the general trend in public 
governance towards emphasizing shared governance and – as such – it would 
improve competition policy consistency as well as being an example of “better 
regulation”, a goal of the EU.293 Doing such should not be seen as support for Neo-
Brandeisian thoughts about expanding the scope of antitrust, nor its European 
relative of ‘fairness’ in competition law. Instead, incentivizing firms to take on the 
societal role they could have in competition enforcement would constitute aiding 
the subjects (and objects) of both market economy as well as the competition law 
and policy that ensures its functioning to make the system work a little better. 
Encouraging competition compliance with positive incentives could be a way 
to approach the thorny questions involved in deepening multilateral competition 
cooperation, but from an unconventional – and perhaps a politically less sensitive – 
angle. Most nations have codified competition law, but enforcement is often 
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lacking or inconsistent. Incentives to maintain effective compliance programs and 
to be transparent about them could help make up for part of the deficit by allowing 
firms to live up to their public role in competition enforcement. This, in turn, could 
lead to less of a need for extraterritorial application by nations with more vigorous 
competition enforcement. All in all, the state of international antitrust could see 
improvement.  
Many developing countries suffer from inefficient markets and an approach 
that could help markets function better would inevitably benefit local economies 
and consumers. Not to mention that cooperating in building standards in relation to 
competition compliance incentives could help build both trust between the 
developing world and the EU and the US – the traditional leaders in competition 
matters – and also confidence in the advantages of market-oriented competition 
policy in general.  
In addition to rewarding compliance efforts, other ways in which to better 
harness the potential of private firms as soft enforcers, in the extension of 
competition agencies, should be encouraged. Also, firms and other non-
governmental actors could be better included in transgovernmental networks. For 
instance, the ICN currently allows firm legal counsels to participate in its Working 
Groups, but said participation tends to be rather limited, as NCAs are key actors.294 
Ways to ensure more impactful participation should be sought in both the ICN as in 
other relevant organizations, such as the OECD and UNCTAD. Deeper firm 
engagement has the potential for deeper commitment towards reducing the 
inconsistency of international antitrust within the firms’ sphere of influence.  
Second, the dissertation updates the general international antitrust discussion to 
address the changed geopolitical power balance in international economic affairs as 
well as to address the fact that most jurisdictions today do have codified 
competition law. Since the last wave of scholarly work, several key aspects have 
changed: there is substantial experience in international voluntary cooperation 
between competition authorities and – perhaps more importantly – the number of 
competition authorities has increased drastically, as has the amount of competition 
law they enforce. Finally, the geopolitical situation has changed, with BRIC 
countries, China in particular, exerting greater influence on international 
cooperation through increased economic power. The mentioned changes have 
profound significance when considering the objectives to strive for in international 
antitrust and – importantly – how to approach such objectives in a regime complex 
reality.  
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These changed circumstances allow potential for deeper cooperation. However, 
cooperation endeavors should acknowledge not only the high number of 
jurisdictions with competition law, but also the increased number of NCAs of 
higher maturity. Thus, there are likely more voices than the transatlantic duo of the 
EU and the US.  
Third, the dissertation reveals fundamental problems that stand in the way of 
deeper cooperation – as cooperation is traditionally conceived at least. 
Globalization and the amount of cross-border business increases year on year and 
with it, so does the need for cooperation to ensure that competition is maintained 
and global markets are efficient. However, beyond a point, cooperation interlinks 
with both trade and, ultimately, politics. While the underlying goals of economic 
major powers – such as the EU, the US, and China – are not necessarily so 
different, the means of reaching them do differ and such differences impose 
inherent limitations on antitrust cooperation.  
It is important to understand these limitations in order to be better able to focus 
on research and consequential proposals based on what is even conceivable. That 
is, cooperation that streamlines and unequivocally supports trade without impacting 
a nation’s sovereignty. Such deeper cooperation could well take place within 
procedural areas. And while binding intergovernmental treaties may not be worth 
striving for, voluntary-based cooperation – either via transgovernmental networks 
or intergovernmental opt-in frameworks – may yet yield significant further benefit.  
Finally, in addition to the mentioned three main contributions, the work is in an 
area that is not commonly researched by legal scholars in the Finnish or Nordic legal 
communities. It could help shed light on the matter and pave the way for future 
research in this region on related topics linking to international antitrust specifically 
or international cooperation in economic and trade matters more generally.  
6.3 Future research is needed 
The dissertation uncovers several research questions that are worthy of future 
research. Of these, research based on empirical data would be of particular use. 
Many questions seem to remain unresolved due to competing – and partially 
conflicting – doctrinal approaches. Actual data could help show the most viable 
path forward and would thus be particularly valuable. Development in this regard 
appears to be coming with initiatives by the OECD and Bradford and Chilton in 
their Comparative Competition Law Project.295 
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In the context of international antitrust, empirical work, inter alia, into the 
prevalence and impact of export cartels could be hugely beneficial. Data is 
currently still surprisingly scarce on the international impact of the current nation-
state system, which relies on an effects-based test in claiming jurisdiction for 
foreign import cartels, while exempting export cartels. This scarcity of empirical 
data in part limits meaningful doctrinal work, preventing it reaching its full 
potential. In particular, being able to link the current situation to past practices and 
thus uncovering whether this is becoming a more or less significant problem would 
be useful. 
Another theme where empirical data could be significantly relevant concerns 
the effectiveness of convergence as a strategy for improving international antitrust 
and the international organizations that aim to facilitate it, such as the ICN, the 
OECD, the ICC, and the UNCTAD. Said strategy has been the primary mode for 
advancing international antitrust for the past decade, yet its weight and impact 
lacks proper auditing. This could be done, inter alia, by looking at various 
recommendations and other soft law that they have published and whether a 
correlation can be found in approaches taken by national competition regimes in 
their respective areas. As a reference point of a general nature, the ICN 
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification and Review Procedures have 
been shown to have contributed to merger control reforms in tens of competition 
authorities.296 Research diving deeper into what is behind such a result could bring 
interesting insights to the ways in which voluntary cooperation is successful but 
could also show where another approach is needed. 
Work that would help understand the impact of utilizing public interest 
considerations as a part of competition policy would also be useful, particularly 
such research that takes international dimensions into consideration. As Stiglitz and 
Fox argue, many countries – and developing countries in particular – do benefit 
from national competition law that protects certain national champions or other 
domestically relevant public interests.297 It could be useful to better understand 
where the boundaries of these benefits lie and in what kinds of particular situations. 
Prior to the ascent of the Chicago School and the consumer welfare test it 
propagates, broader public interest considerations were actually more accepted in 
the US, as well as in Europe. In terms of current debates, the American New 
Brandeis School is arguing that this should be revived and is the subject of much 
discussion in the US.298 While the EU arguably considers what it terms ‘non-
competition’ public interest goals more than the US – such as the integrity of the 
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internal EU market – it has recently been moving towards a narrower, economics-
based way interpreting its competition rules, rather than vice versa. This can be 
seen in the debate on the interrelation of competition law and data protection.299 It 
is beyond the scope of this dissertation to analyze the specifics and possible 
reasons for this, but research into the merits of ‘non-competition’ public interest 
goals as a legitimate part of competition law and policy could prove interesting for 
the development of international antitrust.  
History shows that systems respecting national sovereignty have a better 
success rate than more intrusive options. However, coordinated efforts are 
necessary in an ever-globalizing world. Reconciling the two requires creativity and 
compromise. In any case, a better world order of international antitrust calls for 
renewed interest in and optimism towards structured multilateral frameworks.  
 
 
299  See e.g. Geradin & Kuschewsky (2013); and Kalimo & Majcher (2017). 
 72 
Laws and Abbreviations 
ANSAC American Natural Soda Ash Corporation 
Australian Competition and Consumer Act (2010). 
BRIC Brazil, Russia, India, China 
China People’s Republic of China 
China’s Anti-Monopoly Law Anti-Monopoly Law of the People's Republic of 
China, implemented as of 1 August 2008. 
ESG Environmental, Social, and Governance 
EU Blocking Regulation  Council Regulation (EC) No. 2271/96 of 22 
November 1996 (as amended) 
DG Directorate-General of the EU 
DOJ US Department of Justice 
ECJ European Court of Justice 
EU European Union 
Export Trading Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4003 [2000] 
Foreign Trade Antitrust  
Improvements Act 15 U.S.C. § 6a [2000] 
FTC Federal Trade Commission 
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
ICC International Chamber of Commerce 
ICN International Competition Network 
ISO International Standardisation Organisation 
ITO International Trade Organisation 
MNC Multinational corporation 
NCA National competition authority 
NGO Non-governmental organization 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development 
OPEC Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries 
Russia Russian Federation 
TA Trade agreement 
TFEU Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union 
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TRIPs The Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights 
UK Bribery Act  Bribery Act 2010 
UK Enterprise and  
Regulatory Reform Act Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 
UN United Nations 
UNCTAD United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development 
UN Framework Convention on Climate Change 
US United States of America 
U.S.C.  United States Code 
Webb-Pomerene Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65. [1973]. 
WTO World Trade Organisation 
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